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HOW UNIVERSITY TITLE IX
ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER DISCIPLINE
PROCESSES (PROBABLY) DISCRIMINATE
AGAINST MINORITY STUDENTS
By Ben Trachtenberg*
This Article argues that university discipline procedures likely discriminate
against minority students and that increasingly muscular Title IX enforcement—
launched with the best of intentions in response to real problems—almost certainly exacerbates yet another systemic barrier to racial justice and equal access
to educational opportunities. Unlike elementary and secondary schools, universities do not keep publicly available data on the demographics of students subjected to institutional discipline, which prevents evaluation of possible disparate racial impact in higher education. Further, several aspects of the university
disciplinary apparatus—including broad and vague definitions of offenses, limited access to legal counsel, and irregular procedures—increase the risk that minority students will suffer disproportionate suspensions and other punishment.
This Article brings needed attention to an understudied aspect of Title IX enforcement and raises concerns about the potential effects of implicit bias. While
many commentators and courts have addressed whether university disciplinary
procedures mistreat men—or, instead, even now provide inadequate protection
for college women—few observers have discussed possible racial implications,
which may explain (and be explained by) the current lack of data. Outside the
context of sex-discrimination cases, university discipline procedures for quotidian
matters such as plagiarism and alcohol abuse likely exhibit similar racial biases.
This Article argues that the U.S. Department of Education should use its authority under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to require that colleges and
universities immediately begin collecting and publishing the sort of data already
reported by elementary and secondary schools, thereby allowing observers to assess the scope of disparate impact in campus discipline processes.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. I would like to thank
everyone who has read earlier drafts and provided comments, including candid confidential
responses from university presidents and other officials dedicated to promoting equal opportunity on campus. Among others, I appreciate feedback from Anne Alexander, Tina Bloom,
Sam Halabi, Kevin McDonald, Allen Sessoms, Tommy Tobin, Mark Yudof, various
Trachtenbergs, and the Drake Law School faculty who attended my August 2017 presentation in Des Moines.
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INTRODUCTION
Given the disproportionate suspensions of black students by elementary
and secondary schools,1 along with what is known about racial bias in the criminal justice system,2 it would be a miracle if university disciplinary procedures
did not produce outcomes that excessively punish black students, along with
members of other disadvantaged minority groups. One would expect more university charges per capita to be filed against black students than whites, and one
would expect to find more per capita suspensions of black students.3 But such
results have not been observed. Not because unexpected justice is located in the
records of student conduct panels. No, university records do not contain evidence that students of all races face campus discipline at similar rates. Instead,
one cannot find evidence of disparate impact for the straightforward reason that
universities do not bother to collect—much less to publish—data that would
allow such an assessment.4
For public elementary and secondary schools, rich data exists concerning
disciplinary outcomes, allowing analysis of how the school discipline process
has a disparate impact on students of different races.5 The unfairness is so
stark—black students are suspended about three times as often as white students6—that reform advocates refer to the current system as a “school-to-prison
pipeline.”7 The U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Education
have instructed public schools of “their obligations under Federal law to administer student discipline without discriminating on the basis of race, color, or na-

1

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
3
For speculation by other scholars to this effect, see Nancy Gertner, Complicated Process,
125 YALE L.J. F. 442, 442–43 (2016); Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in
Title IX Enforcement, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 103, 106–08 (2015). For a contrary argument,
see Notes: Antuan M. Johnson, Title IX Narratives, Intersectionality, and Male-Biased Conceptions of Racism, 9 GEO. J. L.& MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. 57, 59 (2017). For a good overview of this issue published while this Article was in the editing process, see Emily Yoffe,
The Question of Race in Campus Sexual-Assault Cases, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/the-question-of-race-in-campus-sexu
al-assault-cases/539361 [https://perma.cc/BPZ4-84XS].
4
See infra Section III.A.
5
See DANIEL J. LOSEN & JONATHAN GILLESPIE, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DISPARATE
IMPACT OF DISCIPLINARY EXCLUSION FROM SCHOOL 6 (The Ctr. for Civil Rights Remedies at
The Civil Rights Project at UCLA, 2012); Roger McKinney, Black and Low-Income Students More Frequently Suspended from School, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Dec. 28, 2014),
http://www.columbiatribune.com/e126a57e-da88-5f54-ad51-0e152afd24fc.html [https://per
ma.cc/24ZH-3PML] (using “data collected by Columbia Public Schools” to evaluate the
school district).
6
See LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note 5, at 6.
7
See id. at 4; Russell J. Skiba et al., More than a Metaphor: The Contribution of Exclusionary Discipline to a School-to-Prison Pipeline, 47 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 546, 546
(2014).
2
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tional origin.”8 In short, while no magic bullet is available to solve the problem,
the problem at least has a name, and efforts are underway in some quarters to
attack it. Reformers are using education, advocacy, litigation, and legislation in
various ways.9
In the criminal justice system—that is, the “real courts,” as opposed to the
quasi-judicial proceedings of K-12 schools and universities—researchers find
disparate impact by race in arrests, prosecutions, convictions, and sentencing.10
This is not news. Criminal law and procedure teachers have told students of this
for decades, and the evidence is abundant that black Americans are much more
likely than whites to spend time in prison.11
Meanwhile, in response to recent pressure from the U.S. Department of
Education,12 colleges and universities across the country have hurriedly and
vastly expanded the offices dedicated to investigating and punishing sex discrimination and sexual misconduct on campus.13 At the same time, universities
are scrambling to become more welcoming to students of all races.14 It seems

8

See, e.g., Joint Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y, Office of Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., & Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div.,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Justice,
to
Colleague
(Jan.
8,
2014)
(on
file
at
https://www2.ed.gov/print/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401-title-vi.html [https:
//perma.cc/SCP8-B8QE]).
9
See Judith A.M. Scully, Examining and Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Strategies for a Better Future, 68 ARK. L. REV. 959, 990–95 (2016) (discussing strategies).
10
See, e.g., MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 131 (2d ed. 2006); THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 1 (2013); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY xii (1995).
11
See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Racial Disparities in Prison Getting Worse in the 1990s, 8
OVERCROWDED TIMES 1 (Feb. 1997); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of
Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2004).
12
See, e.g., Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 204–06 (D. Mass. 2017) (describing
how one college changed its policies in response to DOE guidance); CATHERINE LHAMON,
ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2014) (documenting various
letters and other guidance provided by DOE OCR to postsecondary institutions). On September 22, 2017, DOE rescinded the April 29, 2014 “Questions and Answers” guidance
document. See Dear Colleague Letter from Candice Jackson, Acting Assistant Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t Educ. Office for Civil Rights (Sept. 22, 2017). OCR also issued some interim guidance on the same day. See id.
13
See, Risa L. Lierberwitz et al., The History, Uses, and Abuses of Title IX, 102 BULL. AM.
ASS’N U. PROFESSORS 69, 73 (2016); Juliet Eilperin, Biden and Obama Rewrite the Rulebook
on
College
Sexual
Assaults,
WASH.
POST
(July
3,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-and-obama-rewrite-the-rulebook-on-college
-sexual-assaults/2016/07/03/0773302e-3654-11e6-a254-2b336e293a3c_story.html?utm_te
rm=.233c2c5ca670 [https://perma.cc/4JRK-WNVN].
14
See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206, 2208 (2016) (discussing elaborate efforts by university to gain “the educational benefits that flow from diversity”); LORELLE L. ESPINOSA ET AL., RACE, CLASS, & COLLEGE ACCESS: ACHIEVING DIVERSITY
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that little attention has been given to the risk that these two efforts might be in
tension. Might it be possible, even likely, that the hammer wielded by beefed
up university offices dedicated to prosecuting sex discrimination is falling disproportionately on minority students? Indeed, when one stops to consider the
question, isn’t it nearly impossible to imagine that Title IX enforcement does
not have a disparate impact on the basis of race?15
This Article argues that university discipline procedures likely discriminate
against minority students and that increasingly muscular Title IX enforcement—launched with the best of intentions in response to real problems—
almost certainly exacerbates yet another systemic barrier to racial justice and
equal access to educational opportunities. Part I examines evidence from a university that has investigated the impact of its discipline system on students of
different races and has then shared its findings. Part II provides a baseline for
expectations and analysis by briefly reviewing the well-documented racial biases in discipline imposed upon elementary and secondary school students as
well as in the American criminal justice system. Returning to higher education,
Part III then examines how several features of campus discipline processes, including the failure to collect demographic data, enhance the risk of racially disparate impacts. Part IV suggests avenues for reform, including a call for the
U.S. Department of Education to collect and publish data on the demographics
of students disciplined by universities. Part V then addresses broader implications, including the role of “shadow law” in the federal regulation of university
discipline systems and campus sex, issues of “intersectionality” that arise from
competing claims for justice related to sex and race, and possible fruitful future
research.
Among other things, Part VI briefly discusses whether racial biases affect
how colleges and universities respond to victims of assault, discrimination, and
other misconduct. It is possible, for example, that black women are less likely
than other victims of sexual assault to seek help from university authorities, or
that universities take their complaints less seriously than those of white women.
Disparate treatment of complainants (and of those who could be complainants
but never file reports) is worthy of its own article. This Article, however, focuses on respondents—that is, those students accused of misconduct—and on
how campus proceedings likely treat accused students differently depending on
their race.
In part, this Article addresses the interaction of two narratives concerning
modern American higher education. One narrative recounts inadequate reacSHIFTING LEGAL LANDSCAPE 1 (2015); John Eligon, After Racist Episodes, Blunt Discussions on Campus, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/educ
ation/edlife/university-of-missouri-struggles-to-bridge-its-racial-divide.html [https://perma.
cc/65AJ-456B].
15
“Title IX” refers to Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681. The statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex at educational programs and
activities receiving federal funds. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.1.
IN A
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tions by universities to the harassment and rape of students, particularly women. It also tells of hard-won improvements to the campus environment, as well
as the unceasing effort of activists for gender equality and the significant work
that remains unfinished. The other narrative recounts the constant struggle for
racial equality on campus, beginning in the days of de jure segregation and celebrating civil rights milestones. It tells too of stubborn impediments to racial
justice and continued campaigns for change. At least occasionally, these narratives conflict with one another. The tension evokes competing claims for justice
made during debates in the 1990s about proposed amendments to Federal Rules
of Evidence related to rape and child molestation cases, which were aimed at
protecting women and children by increasing the odds that sexual predators
would be convicted.16 Critics argued that the new rules, which eventually were
enacted, would harm minority men.17
This Article examines how certain efforts to win equal access for women to
higher education may have inadvertently complicated the quest for racial justice. If my ultimate conclusion gains acceptance—that is, if leaders in higher
education agree that the threat of racial bias in campus discipline is real and
demands attention—it will be important not to lose sight of the gender equity
issues that, after languishing without broad recognition for far too long, have
recently inspired important campus reforms.
I.

DOCUMENTED INSTANCES OF DISPARATE RACIAL IMPACT AT
UNIVERSITIES

At the University of Virginia, the Honor System is serious business.18 The
university’s handbook for faculty members and teaching assistants refers to the
Honor System as “the University’s most cherished tradition,” one which “defines the institution and creates the basis for our standard of conduct in the
community.”19 Known as a “single sanction” regime, Virginia’s system has one
available punishment: “Students found guilty of an Honor offense are perma-

16

See 140 CONG. REC. H23,602 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari)
(“The enactment of this reform is first and foremost a triumph for the public—for the women
who will not be raped and the children who will not be molested because we have strengthened the legal system’s tools for bringing the perpetrators of these atrocious crimes to justice.”).
17
See, e.g., Katherine K. Baker, Once A Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in
Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 592 (1997) (“Poor, minority men with an alleged prior
record will be much more likely to be falsely identified, improperly tried, and wrongfully
convicted for stranger rapes that they did not commit.”). The provisions are codified at FED.
R. EVID. 413–415.
18
See VIRGINIUS DABNEY, MR. JEFFERSON’S UNIVERSITY: A HISTORY 9–10, 196 (1981); Coy
Barefoot, The Evolution of Honor: Enduring Principle, Changing Times, UVA MAG. (Spring
2008), http://uvamagazine.org/articles/the_evolution_of_honor/ [https://perma.cc/GF4QNLA4].
19
UNIV. OF VA. HONOR SYS., HANDBOOK FOR FACULTY MEMBERS AND TEACHING
ASSISTANTS (2014) (introductory letter by Rector George Martin).
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nently dismissed from the University.”20 Although concerns are perennially
raised about the single sanction regime—perhaps it is too harsh, perhaps it deters the reporting of violations—the system has endured since 1842.21
For much of the Honor System’s history, the university admitted no black
students against whom the policy could possibly discriminate.22 Sometime after
the racial integration of the university, UVA began keeping statistics on the
demographics of students charged with, and dismissed for, honor offenses.23
These data indicated that black students were charged and dismissed at vastly
higher rates than white students.24 In the 1980s, students running the Honor
System noted that “non-mainstream students had become primary targets for
honor investigations.”25 The Cavalier Daily reported in 1988 that “statistics for
the last year show that 29.7 percent of honor accusations are made against
black students, a number which is disproportionately higher than the approximately eight percent of blacks attending the University.”26 A study released in
1996 by the honor committee’s diversity task force contained similar results,
revealing “that even though black students make up only 12 percent of the student body, they accounted for 35 percent of honor investigations and 23 percent
of students dismissed.”27 A decade later, UVA reacted to statistics telling the
same story. When the 2008–09 Honor Committee released demographic data
about its cases, it reported that black students accounted for one-third of all accused students.28
The current Honor System faculty handbook reports continued disparities.
“Over the years, there have been serious concerns that the Honor System disproportionately affects minority students, specifically in the number of reports
received by the Honor Committee.”29 Once students are reported, students from
various racial groups are found guilty at similar rates, meaning that the disparate expulsion of black students is attributable almost entirely to disparate re20

Id. at 2. In recent years an intermediate sanction (two semesters’ suspension) has been
made available to students who admit guilt quickly upon being notified of a charge. See id. at
7. But all students found guilty after a hearing are expelled. See id. at 11.
21
See Barefoot, supra note 18.
22
See James Latimer, Negro Wins Suit to Enter Law School at University; State Fails to
Give Equal Facilities, Judges Point Out, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Sept. 6, 1950).
23
See Barefoot, supra note 18.
24
See id.
25
See id.
26
See id. (quoting CAVALIER DAILY).
27
See Nicola White, Lawsuit Raises Questions About Honor, CAVALIER DAILY (Feb. 2,
2000), http://www.cavalierdaily.com/article/2000/02/lawsuit-raises-questions-about-honor
[https://perma.cc/5GXJ-CRT7].
28
See Cameron Feller, University Community Reacts to Diversity Statistics from Committee,
CAVALIER DAILY (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.cavalierdaily.com/article/2009/04/universitycommunity-reacts-to-diversity-statistic [https://perma.cc/PE3G-ANJH] (“I was a little bit
surprised at the disproportionate number of minority students reported . . .”).
29
See UNIV. OF VA. HONOR SYS., supra note 19, at 14 (section titled “Diversity and the
Honor System”).
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porting rates.30 Two primary explanations present themselves for the pattern of
disparity observed for decades. Perhaps black students at the University of Virginia are more likely than their white peers to lie, cheat, and steal. Or, perhaps
among those students who do commit honor offenses, black students are more
likely to be reported. The university seems to find the second explanation more
accurate (as do I), noting the phenomena of “spotlighting” and “dimming.”31
The faculty handbook explains as follows:
Spotlighting occurs when those who naturally stand out from those around them
draw more scrutiny than their peers. Conversely, “dimming” refers to the potential for some students to avoid notice as they more readily blend in. Asian students, international students, and student-athletes in particular have seen a disproportionate number of cases reported against them at various times.32

A 2001 Cavalier Daily editorial provides further evidence for the “spotlighting theory,” drawn from honor charges filed from 2000 to 2001.33 Of all
students against whom charges were filed that year, “44.2 percent of those students were white, although the student body is 71.2 percent white. Black students comprise 23.4 percent of those investigated but only 9.5 percent of the
student body.”34 Most telling is that of the black students accused that year, not
a single one was convicted.35 Unless the Honor Committee was brazenly discriminating in favor of accused black students, one cannot help but conclude
that, somehow, black students were over-reported for misconduct.
Virginia deserves credit for collecting and releasing the data that paint such
an unflattering picture of the university in the preceding paragraphs. In a sense,
Virginia has “spotlighted” itself, causing it to “stand out from those around [it
and] draw more scrutiny than [its] peers.”36 Let us consider now whether Virginia is probably some sort of bizarre outlier or if, instead, it is more likely that
data from other institutions—were they only available—would yield similar
results. Is Virginia a hotbed of racial bias, substantially more so than the bulk
of American universities? I certainly have no evidence to support such a claim.
Until other colleges examine the beams in their eyes, they would be wise to
avoid suggesting that Virginia deserves special criticism for its mote.37
The University of Virginia surely has its problems with race. It did, after
all, exclude black students entirely for more than a century,38 and that sort of
30

See id.
Id.
32
Id.
33
See Cavalier Daily Staff, Lead Editorial: Pinpointing Bias, CAVALIER DAILY (Apr. 10,
2001), http://www.cavalierdaily.com/article/2001/04/lead-editorial16276 [https://perma.cc/
746L-5WPH].
34
Id.
35
See id.
36
See supra text accompanying note 32.
37
See Matthew 7:3–5.
38
See Latimer, supra note 22 (describing decision “which for the first time breached State
segregation policies surrounding Thomas Jefferson’s 125-year-old citadel of learning”).
31
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behavior tends to leave a mark on institutional culture. Then again, universities
in free states were not beacons of racial equality either during UVA’s segregated days. Yale College, for example, opened in 1701 and admitted its first black
student in the 1850s.39 In 1964, it admitted a record number of black freshmen:
fourteen.40 Would it be unreasonable to speculate that vestiges of Old Yale impede the progress of black Elis today?41
II. POINTS OF COMPARISON: ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS, SECONDARY SCHOOLS,
AND REAL COURTS
To help decide whether racially disparate impact likely pervades university
discipline nationwide—as opposed to infecting just a few institutions here and
there—this Part examines contexts beyond higher education in which disciplinary records are far easier to obtain.
The disproportionate exclusion of minority students from the nation’s elementary and secondary schools has been amply documented. Similarly, the
tremendous racial inequities wrought by America’s criminal justice system are
well known. But a very brief review of these systems is nonetheless helpful for
two reasons. First, it provides context in which observers may evaluate the university discipline system, creating the strong presumption that absent some significant intervention by university officials, disparate impact on the basis of
race should be expected. Second, it invites a discussion of certain features of
university discipline—particularly Title IX enforcement—that not only fail to
rebut the presumption but instead provide further reason to believe that university discipline systems discriminate against minority students.
A. Racial Injustice in Elementary and Secondary School Discipline
Disproportionate suspension and expulsion of black students from American elementary and secondary schools have been observed for more than four
decades.42 As soon as schools began collecting data concerning the demographics of those excluded from schools in the 1970s, educators found racial
disparities, raising questions of whether the disparate treatment of black stu39

See Ariel Kaminer, Discovery Leads Yale to Revise a Chapter of Its Black History, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/nyregion/discovery-leads-yaleto-revise-a-chapter-of-its-black-history.html [https://perma.cc/L2C4-FTKJ].
40
See Judith Ann Schiff, Pioneers, YALE ALUMNI MAG. (2006).
41
Probably not. See Victor Wang, FAS Senate Draft Report Reveals “Lost Decade” for
Women,
Minority
Hiring,
YALE
DAILY
NEWS
(Apr.
27,
2016),
https://yaledailynews.com/blog/2016/04/27/fas-senate-report-reveals-lost-decade-forwomen-minority-hiring/ [https://perma.cc/Y4LD-F9QP].
42
See Mark G. Yudof, Suspension and Expulsion of Black Students from the Public Schools:
Academic Capital Punishment and the Constitution, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 374, 374–75
(1975). This article is so old that Professor Yudof, known more recently for his work as a
chancellor and president, wrote it years before beginning his career as a university administrator.
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dents violated constitutional guarantees or other anti-discrimination law.43 They
still find disparities today.44 And in jurisdictions allowing schools to impose
corporal punishment,45 scholars have documented racial bias in its use,46 meaning that minority students suffer literal “disparate impact.”47
Closer inspection of school discipline records reveals an important pattern:
Schools produce greater disparities among students of different races when they
punish ambiguously-defined misconduct—such as “disrespect” and “excessive
noise”—than when they punish more clearly-defined wrongdoing like smoking.48 While black students are far more likely than white students to be sanctioned for “disrespect,” the punishment rates for vandalism are similar.49 (The
greater subjectivity involved in findings of “disrespect” is shown by the need
for quotation marks around the name of the offense to signal a term of art.) One
can imagine debatable cases of possible school property vandalism, but the
concept is straightforward. “Disrespect,” by contrast, truly does depend on the
perspective of the beholder. For whatever reason, even though black students
and white students are caught smoking and defacing property at similar rates,
school teachers and principals deem black students to be substantially more
“disrespectful.”50
The perception of black students as more culpable—and thus deserving
greater school discipline—accords with psychological research showing that
black boys are viewed as older and less innocent than whites.51 (Relatedly,
43

See id. at 381.
See Rachel M. Cohen, Rethinking School Discipline, AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 2, 2016),
http://prospect.org/article/rethinking-school-discipline [https://perma.cc/74U3-7U9X] (reporting that “expulsions and suspensions . . . are doled out disproportionately to minority
students”); Scully, supra note 9, at 972–73 (“Data from the Department of Education indicates that while Black children comprise sixteen percent of public school enrollment, they
constitute between thirty-two and forty-two percent of out-of-school suspensions or expulsions.”).
45
See Valerie Strauss, 19 States Still Allow Corporal Punishment in School, WASH. POST
(Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/09/18/19states-still-allow-corporal-punishment-in-school/ [https://perma.cc/JVH2-VV9T].
46
See Stephen S. Owen, The Relationship Between Social Capital and Corporal Punishment
in Schools: A Theoretical Inquiry, 37 YOUTH & SOC’Y 85, 88–89 (2005) (collecting studies).
47
It is difficult to decide which is worse, the racial discrimination or the underlying fact that
some students suffer corporal punishment at the hands of public school teachers. In any
event, for black students, the injury of corporal punishment adds to the insult of knowing
that racial bias may well have contributed to their suffering.
48
See Russell J. Skiba et al., The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender Disproportionality in School Punishment, 34 URB. REV. 317, 317, 332 (2002) (finding that racial
disparities are greater for offenses more “subjective in interpretation,” as opposed to more
concrete violations like “smoking” and “vandalism”).
49
See id.
50
See id. at 332, 334.
51
See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing
Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 526 (2014) (“Black boys are
seen as older and less innocent and that they prompt a less essential conception of childhood
than do their White same-age peers.”).
44
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black juveniles are far more likely to be tried in the adult court system, where
they receive harsher sentences than white juvenile offenders.52) For black girls,
perceptions that they are “loud, defiant, and precocious” contribute to their disproportionate punishment.53 Excessive punishment falls particularly harshly on
darker-skinned black girls.54
Critics have a name for the collection of school policies that punish black
children at disproportionate rates and introduce them into the criminal justice
system: the “school-to-prison pipeline.”55 As one scholar put it, “The school-toprison pipeline is a devastating process through which many of our children—
particularly males and students of color—receive an inadequate education and
are then pushed out of public schools and into the criminal punishment system.”56 Because the problem is so serious, it is on the agenda of groups such as
the American Civil Liberties Union, the Children’s Defense Fund, the NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the Southern Poverty Law Center.57
The U.S. Department of Education, along with the U.S. Department of Justice,
has issued guidance to schools on how to reduce racial discrimination in their
disciplinary policies and practices.58
Disparate treatment of black students is by no means limited to high school
students and others who might plausibly fit the profile of a juvenile delinquent.
The Department of Education has observed that excessive punishment of black
students begins in preschool.59 According to the Civil Rights Data Collection,
52

See, e.g., PAOLO G. ANNINO ET AL., JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NON-HOMICIDE
OFFENSES: FLORIDA COMPARED TO NATION (2009); Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Aneeta Rattan,
The Race Factor in Trying Juveniles as Adults, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/05/when-to-punish-a-young-offender-andwhen-to-rehabilitate/the-race-factor-in-trying-juveniles-as-adults [https://perma.cc/MT2CXKBL].
53
See MONIQUE W. MORRIS, PUSHOUT: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF BLACK GIRLS IN SCHOOLS
11, 13 (2016); Edward W. Morris, “Ladies” or “Loudies”? Perceptions and Experiences of
Black Girls in Classrooms, 38 YOUTH & SOC. 490, 490 (2007).
54
See Lance Hannon et al., The Relationship Between Skin Tone and School Suspension for
African Americans, 5 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 281, 281 (2013) (finding that while dark skin correlates with greater punishment, the results were “disproportionately driven by the experiences of African American females”). For evidence of the same phenomenon in criminal
courtrooms, see Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 383
(2006).
55
See generally Skiba et al., supra note 7; Scully, supra note 9, at 960.
56
Scully, supra note 9, at 959.
57
See id. at 959 n.1.
58
See U.S. Departments of Education and Justice Release School Discipline Guidance
Package to Enhance School Climate and Improve School Discipline Policies/Practices, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC. (Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-departmentseducation-and-justice-release-school-discipline-guidance-package-enhance-school-climateand-improve-school-discipline-policiespractices [https://perma.cc/28WE-2YRU].
59
U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, DATA
SNAPSHOT:
SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE,
ISSUE
BRIEF
N O.
1,
1
(2014),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-discipline-snapshot.pdf [https://perma.
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“Black children represent 18% of preschool enrollment, but 48% of preschool
children receiving more than one out-of-school suspension; in comparison,
white students represent 43% of preschool enrollment but 26% of preschool
children receiving more than one out of school suspension.”60 These findings
accord with research showing that when preschool teachers are told to look out
for bad behavior, they tend to focus attention on black boys.61
The pattern continues for all of K-12 education.62 Overall, “Black students
are suspended and expelled at a rate three times greater than white students.63
On average, 5% of white students are suspended, compared to 16% of black
students.”64 Further, just as “school-to-prison pipeline” critics describe, schools
refer black students to the criminal justice system at disproportionate rates.65
“While black students represent 16% of student enrollment, they represent 27%
of students referred to law enforcement and 31% of students subjected to a
school-related arrest. In comparison, white students represent 51% of enrollment, 41% of students referred to law enforcement, and 39% of those arrested.”66 Observers have found disparate racial impact in the public school discipline of all fifty states.67
While one can debate the cause, the results are stark. For whatever reason,
American schools punish black students far more than they punish white students. Whether in preschool, high school, or anything in between, black students more commonly receive suspensions and expulsions, and a higher percentage of black students are delivered by schools to police. Once the police
become involved, students experience all of the racial bias observed in the
criminal justice system.
B. Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice System
On December 31, 2015, the United States held 1,476,847 sentenced prisoners under the jurisdiction of state or federal correctional authorities.68 About
523,000 of them, 35.4 percent of the total, were black.69 Of the entire United
cc/LB26-ZNYU] (using 2011-2012 data).
60
Id.
61
See Walter S. Gilliam et al., Do Early Educators’ Implicit Biases Regarding Sex and Race
Relate to Behavior Expectations and Recommendations of Preschool Expulsions and Suspensions? YALE CHILD STUDY CTR. 2 (2016) (“Findings revealed that when expecting challenging behaviors teachers gazed longer at Black children, especially Black boys.”).
62
U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 1.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See Scully, supra note 9, at 960, 960 n.3.
68
E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH ANDERSON, U.S. DEP’T JUST., BUREAU JUST. STAT., NCJ
250229, PRISONERS IN 2015 6 (2016).
69
Id. This figure “excludes persons of Hispanic or Latino origin and persons of two or more
races.”
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States population in 2015, about 13.3 percent was black.70 One could reproduce
similar statistics for persons held in local jails and on probation, and one could
disaggregate the data by state. Regardless of how one slices it, however, the result would not change much. Black Americans are overwhelmingly more likely
than whites to find themselves under the control of the penal system.71 Although the causes are complicated and the subject of much debate,72 the raw
numbers tell a story one cannot deny.
Racial disparities pervade the criminal justice system from investigation to
incarceration. At the earliest stages of what might become a criminal case,
when police decide what and whom to investigate, race affects the likelihood
that police will seize a person going about his daily business and subject him to
a search.73 The stop-and-frisk program in New York City, found unconstitutional in federal court,74 is perhaps the most prominent example of a nationwide
phenomenon. Blacks fare no better in vehicles than on foot. The Missouri Attorney General, for example, found that although police had a higher “contraband hit rate” when pulling over white motorists, black motorists were far more
likely to be stopped and to have their vehicles searched.75 Whether in or out of
cars, black suspects are also arrested at higher rates than whites.76 Racial dis-

70

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, “QUICK FACTS,” https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/
PST045216 [https://perma.cc/7SLC-PT52] (also measuring black Americans reporting “only
one race”).
71
See generally MAUER, supra note 10, at 1; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 10.
72
See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 114–15 (2012); CHRIS HAYES, A COLONY IN A NATION 113–14 (2017);
JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion is the major engine of
mass incarceration).
73
See David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660–61 (1994); The Editorial Board, Racial Discrimination in Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/
13/opinion/racial-discrimination-in-stop-and-frisk.html [https://perma.cc/3PV3-GFH4] (recounting federal court findings about stop-and-frisk in New York City).
74
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 664–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
75
See, e.g., OFFICE OF MO. ATT’Y GEN., VEHICLE STOPS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2015),
https://www.ago.mo.gov/home/vehicle-stops-report/2015-executive-summary
[https://perma.cc/XL24-BTJK]. White “contraband hit rate” was 29.57 percent, and black
“contraband hit rate” was 24.44 percent. While accounting for 10.9 percent of the state population, blacks constituted 17.5 percent of motorists stopped by police.
76
See Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the Question of
Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 419 (2005); Paula J. Fite et al., Explaining
Discrepancies in Arrest Rates Between Black and White Male Juveniles, 77 J. CONSULTING
& CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 916, 916 (2009) (“When examining arrest rates, one finds racial discrepancies that cannot be ignored.”); Brad Heath, Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates: ‘Staggering Disparity’, USA TODAY (Nov. 18, 2014, 5:13 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/new
s/nation/2014/11/18/ferguson-black-arrest-rates/19043207 [https://perma.cc/SF5V-VKUN]
(noting that racial disparity in arrest rates observed in Ferguson, Missouri was exceeded by
at least “1,581 other police departments across the USA”).
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parities in arrest rates are observed both for juveniles and adults.77 And police
officers use force against black suspects at much higher rates than against white
suspects.78 Police officers, along with witnesses who provide information to police, appear to systemically find black Americans more suspicious than whites,
and thereby subject blacks to more intense investigation and policing than
whites.79
Upon conviction, black defendants receive harsher sentences than those
imposed on whites.80 Although this phenomenon has multiple causes and has
inspired much debate,81 it is nearly impossible to argue that the entire disparity
is attributable to differential offense rates and the severity of offenses committed.82 That is, the harsher sentences cannot be explained as a straightforward
consequence of worse behavior. Instead, sentencing judges, along with the probation officials who prepare pre-sentence reports, appear to systemically find
black convicts to be more dangerous (or culpable) than whites,83 and, accordingly, deserving of greater punishment.84

77

Fite et al., supra note 76, at 916; David Huizinga et al., Disproportionate Minority Contact in the Juvenile Justice System: A Study of Differential Minority Arrest/Referral to Court
in Three Cities i (July 28, 2007) (unpublished report, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention).
78
See PHILLIP ATIBA GOFF ET AL., CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY, THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE:
RACE, ARRESTS, AND POLICE USE OF FORCE 4 (2016) (“[R]acial disparities in police use of
force persist even when controlling for racial distribution of local arrest rates”).
79
Note that no individual officer need be deemed “a racist” for this observation to hold, and
I make no accusations about anyone’s intent. Indeed, no analysis whatsoever of police officer character is needed. One simply observes that for whatever reason, blacks are stopped,
searched, and arrested at higher rates than can be explained by their behavior alone.
80
See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 10, at 12; George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as
Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 554 (1998).
81
One study found that convicts with a more “stereotypically Black features” are more likely to receive death sentences. See EBERHARDT supra note 54, at 383–84; see also Rebecca C.
Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Racial Disparities in Incarceration Increase Acceptance of
Punitive Policies, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1949, 1949 (2014).
82
See, e.g., Eric P. Baumer, Reassessing and Redirecting Research on Race and Sentencing,
30 JUST. Q. 231, 236–37 (2013); ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF
JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 3, 9 (2016).
83
This result accords with psychological research finding that people see black men as larger and more threatening than white men of the same size. See John Paul Wilson et al., Racial
Bias in Judgments of Physical Size and Formidability: From Size to Threat, 113 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 59, 59 (2017).
84
Again, no analysis of the character of judges or probation officers is needed to support
this finding, and I make no claim about anyone’s heart. The focus is on what institutional
actors do, not the sort of persons they are. See Jay Smooth, How to Tell Someone They Sound
Racist, YOUTUBE, (July 21, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0Ti-gkJiXc
[https://perma.cc/7473-ECNY] (discussing difference between a “what[-]they[-]did conversation” and a “what[-]they[-]are conversation,” saying, “When somebody picks my pocket,
I’m not going to be chasing him down so I can figure out whether he feels like he’s a thief
deep down in his heart”).
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In sum, members of racial minorities are more likely than whites to be
stopped and frisked by police and are more likely to be pulled over while driving, despite being less likely to possess contraband when searched. Minorities
are more likely than whites to be arrested for the same conduct and face more
serious charges when prosecuted. And if convicted, minorities receive tougher
sentences. At least some of the factors contributing to racial disparities in the
criminal justice system—such as implicit bias among witnesses and investigators—exist on campus too.
C. Common Themes to Examine at the University Level
In both K–12 school discipline and in real courts, black Americans receive
greater punishment than do whites committing the same conduct. This pattern
persists in rural, suburban, and urban communities, and no state or region is
immune.85 Diligent efforts by scholars, activists, and government officials may
have ameliorated the problem but have not eliminated it. Accordingly, absent
compelling evidence that university discipline procedures have somehow evaded the pitfalls that pervade the criminal justice system and elementary and secondary school discipline, one should presume that universities impose discipline more harshly on their black students than on their white students.
Predicting otherwise demonstrates either naiveté or willful blindness.
When examining the policies and procedures used in university discipline,
observers should pay particular attention to the dangers of implicit bias.86 The
implicit bias exhibited by police officers draws disproportionate numbers of
black Americans into the criminal justice system, setting in motion a process
that results in vastly greater incarceration rates for them. Similarly, the implicit
bias exhibited by elementary and secondary school teachers and administrators
causes disproportionate numbers of black students to be suspended for conduct
described as “disrespect,” thereby placing far more black students into the
school-to-prison pipeline. Even if university officials do not intend to punish
black students more harshly, implicit bias may well cause similar harm on
campus. Further, the more that university officials concern themselves with
conduct about which reasonable persons could disagree (e.g., whether certain
text messages constitute harassment, or whether following someone after class
to ask for a date constituted stalking) as opposed to less debatable offenses
(e.g., vandalism, theft, possession of alcohol in dormitories, invasion of privacy
with hidden cameras), the more that implicit bias among witnesses and university officials can yield racially disparate impact.
In addition, because of the strong correlation between race and socioeconomic status, observers should note any aspects of the university discipline
process that favor students with greater economic and social capital. In the
85

See CARSON & ANDERSON, supra note 68, at 29, appx. tbl. 3; Scully, supra note 9, at 960
n.3; see also supra Section II.A and II.B.
86
For further explanation of implicit bias, see infra Section III.B.
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criminal justice system, access to private lawyers (that is, access to sufficient
money to pay for private lawyers) provides criminal defendants with large advantages over defendants reliant on indigent defense provided by the state.87 If
university processes provide opportunities for wealthier students to purchase
better results—or, to be less crass, to use money to increase their odds of a favorable outcome—then white students will disproportionately avail themselves
of these options. Relatedly, in the elementary and secondary school context,
parents with lower social capital are more likely to have their children excluded
from school.88 If factors like social connections and parental education levels
correlate positively with “good” outcomes (from the perspective of students accused of misconduct),89 then white students more likely to possess such social
capital will disproportionately avoid university discipline.
III. HOW THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF UNIVERSITY TITLE IX
ENFORCEMENT ENHANCES RISKS OF DISPARATE IMPACT ON THE BASIS OF
RACE
Commentators from across the political spectrum have assailed the methods by which universities investigate and punish sexual misconduct and harassment.90 Critics have highlighted the procedural changes forced upon universities by the Department of Education (DOE) Office for Civil Rights, arguing
87

See generally Morris B. Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the “Marginally Indigent,” 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223, 249 (2005);
Jaeah Lee et al., Charts: Why You’re in Deep Trouble If You Can’t Afford a Lawyer,
MOTHER JONES (May 6, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/publicdefenders-gideon-supreme-court-charts/# [https://perma.cc/545C-HTGR].
88
See Ann Meier, Social Capital and School Achievement Among Adolescents 29 (Ctr. for
Demography & Ecology, Univ. of Wis.-Madison, Working Paper No. 99-18, 1999) (“[T]he
probability of being suspended from school decreases with family income and parental education.”); JOANNA TAYLOR ET AL., LAW. COMM. FOR CIV. RIGHTS ECON. JUST., NOT
MEASURING UP: THE STATE OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN MASSACHUSETTS 1 (2014); see also
Aaron Kupchik & Thomas J. Mowen, Hurting Families, in THE REAL SCHOOL SAFETY
PROBLEM: THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF HARSH SCHOOL PUNISHMENT 56–72 (2016)
(illustrating consequences on parents of excluded students).
89
These factors certainly correlate strongly with other good outcomes in the university setting, such as admission to selective programs. See, e.g., Evan J. Mandery, End College Legacy Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, (April 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/opin
ion/end-college-legacy-preferences.html [https://perma.cc/C3A7-933L] (“A Princeton team
found the advantage to be worth the equivalent of 160 additional points on an applicant’s
SAT, nearly as much as being a star athlete. . . .”); T. Rees Shapiro, At U-Va., a ‘Watch List’
Flags VIP Applicants for Special Handling, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.washin
gtonpost.com/local/education/at-u-va-a-watch-list-flags-vip-applicants-for-special-handling/
2017/04/01/9482b256-106e-11e7-9d5a-a83e627dc120_story.html?utm_term=.c1b52dff640a
[https://perma.cc/ZVZ8-3QQZ].
90
See, e.g., LAURA KIPNIS, UNWANTED ADVANCES: SEXUAL PARANOIA COMES TO CAMPUS
(2017) (“If this is feminism, it’s feminism hijacked by melodrama.”); KC JOHNSON &
STUART TAYLOR JR., THE CAMPUS RAPE FRENZY: THE ATTACK ON DUE PROCESS AT
AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES vii (2017) (book by authors previously known for attacks on affirmative action and political correctness).
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that university rules deny “respondents”—as the accused are generally
known—adequate discovery, access to counsel, and impartial finders of facts.91
Others have noted shortcomings not directly attributable to DOE guidance, reporting defects that universities have adopted without federal prompting.92 In
response, supporters of invigorated federal anti-discrimination efforts have argued that the Department is simply doing its job and promoting equal access to
educational opportunity.93 I will largely sidestep the larger debate on whether
universities have gone astray in response to a combination of federal pressure
and genuine desire to combat sexual assault and harassment.
Instead of litigating the general pros and cons of modern Title IX enforcement, this Part focuses on certain attributes of the university discipline apparatus (including, but not limited to, resolution of sexual harassment and misconduct complaints) that increase the risk of racially disparate impact. Among
others, the following aspects of university discipline should worry supporters of
racial equality: (1) universities collect minimal data concerning the racial impact of their discipline systems, and they keep what they collect secret; (2) implicit bias infects the perceptions of victims, other witnesses, investigators, and
hearing examiners and other factfinders; (3) definitions of offenses are broad
and vague; (4) the process is conducted in secret; (5) procedures are informal
and not uniform; (6) counsel for students have limited roles, and access to
counsel is expensive; (7) faculty and administrators who might normally speak
up for racial justice are afraid to undermine Title IX enforcement; and (8) investigations of alleged sexual misconduct are affected by collective American
attitudes toward race and interracial sex. Each of these items is addressed below.

91

See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy,
BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethinkharvard-sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html
[https://perma.cc/Y3AJ-UE4W] (letter from 28 Harvard Law School faculty arguing that
“[W]e find the new sexual harassment policy inconsistent with many of the most basic principles we teach.”); Jodie Jackson Jr., Curators Approve New Title IX Policies; Faculty Push
for Legal Representation, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (last updated Feb. 6, 2015, 1:00 PM),
http://www.columbiatribune.com/f9584490-4ac7-58d2-b260-bcd3700f8968.html
[https://perma.cc/WK5Z-JCC6] (“The changes were adopted despite a letter, signed by some
200 faculty members, pushing to amend the new rules”).
92
See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, What Went Wrong with Title IX?, WASH. MONTHLY
(Sept./Oct. 2015), http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/septoct-2015/what-went-wrongwith-title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/RRT6-9UYT] (“[N]othing in Title IX—nor, crucially, in the
Department of Education’s recent pronouncements about that statute—required Harvard,
Northwestern, or LSU to take the actions that have drawn such criticism”).
93
See Tyler Kingkade, Stop Attacking the Education Department for Enforcing Title IX, 80
Advocacy Groups Say, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/education-department-title-ix_us_57869f24e4b08608d332c880 [https://perma.cc/V5V
5-HEW4] (“ ‘Unfortunately, the Department is facing unwarranted criticism for doing its
job’ ”).
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A. Universities Collect Minimal Data Concerning the Racial Impact of their
Discipline Systems, and they Keep what they Collect Secret
Unlike in real courts, where a diligent researcher could compare indictments and trial transcripts with subsequent sentences imposed by judges, student disciplinary records are not available for public inspection. They are protected as “education records” under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA).94 This protection may be quite sensible but nonetheless prevents
accused students from evaluating possible comparator cases to see if they have
been treated fairly.95
Beyond hindering the defense teams of accused students, the sealing of
student discipline records under FERPA prevents researchers from independently examining whether any particular university—or universities in general—discipline students of different races at different rates. Unless a university
prepares redacted versions of disciplinary records for the convenience of scholars and law reformers, one must take the school’s word on possible racially
disparate impact. Further, unless the university compiles its own statistics—
calculating, for example, what percentage of suspended students is of which
race and how that compares to the broader student body—there is no institutional “word” to take.
In contrast to elementary and secondary schools, which report information
about their discipline cases to the Civil Rights Data Collection operated by the
U.S. Department of Education,96 universities are not required to submit such
data to the federal government.
The unavailability of demographic data concerning disciplined students—
as well as how the missing data prevents outsiders from determining whether
universities engage in racial discrimination—is illustrated by recent lawsuits
against Amherst College and the University of Pennsylvania.97 John Doe, an
Asian-American student expelled by Amherst after being found guilty at a college hearing of rape, alleged that “only male students of color have been punished with separation from the College in connection with sexual misconduct
allegations” since the adoption of new rules designed to accord with DOE
guidance.98 However, despite the perception on campus of past racial dispari94

See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(4)(A) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 99 (2017).
See infra Section III.D (on proceedings conducted in secret).
96
For background on the CRDC, see CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION (CRDC), U.S. DEP’T.
OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/data.html [https://perma.cc/8WDC2YL4] (last updated Nov. 30, 2016).
97
See Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 218–19 (D. Mass. 2017); Doe v. Trs. of
the Univ. of Pa., No. 2:16-CV-05088-JP, at 26 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2016). In each of these
cases, “John Doe” is a pseudonym. Amherst, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 202. Many plaintiffs alleging wrongful university discipline procedures proceed as “John Does.” See, e.g., Doe v. Alger, 317 F.R.D. 37, 42 (W.D. Va. 2016) (concluding “that Doe’s privacy interest outweighs
the presumption of openness in judicial proceedings and that he may thus proceed anonymously”).
98
Amherst, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 224.
95
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ties, the plaintiff could not support his claim because he lacked proof “that other male students have been accused of similar conduct and received less severe
punishments.”99 As a result, although the trial judge denied a motion to dismiss
Doe’s claims of breach of contract related to (1) being found guilty despite insufficient evidence, (2) being denied a fair hearing procedure, and (3) gender
discrimination, the court dismissed his racial discrimination claim.100
Amherst’s lack of data is especially frustrating because the college published a report in 2013 noting a belief on campus that the college treats accused
students differently based on their race.101 The document, entitled “Toward a
Culture of Respect: The Problem of Sexual Misconduct at Amherst College,”
reported, “Many students of color, both male and female, and some international students, believe that the College takes a more punitive attitude toward nonwhite perpetrators, especially if the victim is white.”102 Whatever actions Amherst undertook to combat the perception (and perhaps the reality) of raciallylinked unfairness, it did not include the collection and publication of data by
which Doe could evaluate the treatment of students of different races by the
college’s disciplinary apparatus.103 Despite this handicap, Doe had no problem
convincing the trial court that some of his claims might have merit. For example, the sexual act at issue in Doe’s case occurred while both Doe and the complainant, “Sandra Jones” were intoxicated, and Jones was “far less intoxicated
than Doe.”104 Because the college pursued charges only against Doe—and did
not suggest that Jones committed misconduct by engaging in sexual activity
with Doe, who “has consistently claimed he was ‘blacked out’ and retains no
memory of the night”—Doe claimed that he suffered gender-based discrimination.105 The trial judge found that Doe stated a claim with respect to gender discrimination by articulating disparate treatment; he was charged, and she was
not.106 To bring a race-discrimination claim, however, Doe would have needed
information about other accused students (ideally, white students accused of
conduct similar to his yet not expelled), to which he had no access.
As this article was in the editing process, another John Doe—this one an
African-American student—had his racial discrimination claim dismissed for
99

See id. at 219. This data is also unavailable to victims, preventing them from evaluating
whether colleges take complaints by certain victims more seriously than those by others.
100
Id. at 203–04. Amherst eventually reached a confidential settlement with Doe. See Settlement Order of Dismissal, Civil Action No. 15-30097-MGM (Aug. 2, 2017).
101
See SPECIAL OVERSIGHT COMM. ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, AMHERST C., TOWARD A
CULTURE OF RESPECT: THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AT AMHERST COLLEGE 21
(2013).
102
Id.
103
The report itself noted the unavailability of useful data. See id. (“It is impossible at this
remove to know if this has ever been true, and the records that would tell us are closed or
have been destroyed.”).
104
See Amherst, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 208.
105
See id. at 208, 218.
106
See id. at 224.
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want of “facts that give rise to an inference of racial bias or discrimination.”107
Doe was initially expelled from the University of Pennsylvania (“Penn”) for
violating the university’s sexual violence policy during a sexual encounter with
another student.108 He argued that the sex was consensual and appealed the expulsion decision within the university, which reduced his punishment to a twoyear suspension.109 He then sued, alleging breach of contract, gender discrimination (in violation of Title IX), racial discrimination (in violation of Title VI),
and other legal wrongs.110 As in the Amherst case, the judge deciding the Penn
case held that while the plaintiff provided sufficient evidence of gender discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss—and thereby to reach discovery—
his racial discrimination claim failed.111 The evidence supporting the gender
discrimination claim was somewhat thin. The plaintiff lacked “an allegation of
any arguably inculpatory statements by a representative of the University” and
offered only “allegations regarding training materials and possible procomplainant bias on the part of University officials,” which the judge found
“set forth sufficient circumstances suggesting inherent and impermissible gender bias to support a plausible claim that Defendant violated Title IX under an
erroneous outcome theory.”112
To justify his racial discrimination claim, the Penn plaintiff stated that
“ ‘the respondents in [the] comparable matters . . . were not African American[s]’ and ‘the sanctions recommended and imposed at each stage of the disciplinary process were more severe because of [Plaintiff’s] race and gender.’ ”113 Lacking either statistical evidence or anecdotes about specific white
respondents receiving more lenient treatment, however, Doe’s allegations were
based “upon information and belief.”114 The judge found that plaintiff’s “conclusory allegation that Plaintiff was treated differently in the disciplinary proceedings due to his race” was insufficient to state a claim.115 Again, a university’s opacity with respect to its disciplinary process had spared administrators
from discovery related to possible racial bias.

107

See Doe v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., No. 16-5088, 2017 WL 4049033, at *14, *21–22
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2017) (finding that the complaint “relies exclusively on conclusory allegations that Plaintiff was treated unfairly because of his race”).
108
See id. at *1–*3.
109
See id. at *2–*3.
110
See id. at *4.
111
See id. at *15–*18, *21–*22.
112
See id. at *16.
113
See id. at *21.
114
See id. For an example of the sort of statistical data that would have been useful to Doe,
see Yoffe, supra note 3 (discussing OCR investigation into possible Title VI violations by
Colgate University). “In the 2013–14 academic year, 4.2 percent of Colgate’s students were
black. According to the university’s records, in that year black male students were accused
of 50 percent of the sexual violations reported to the university, and they made up 40 percent
of the students formally adjudicated.”
115
Doe v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 2017 WL 4049033, at *22.
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The inability of Doe and Doe to support their claims about racially disparate impact at Amherst and Penn will not surprise anyone who has tried to collect similar information from other colleges. With the help of a law student research assistant, I contacted the Title IX offices of several universities, asking if
they keep publicly-available data identifying the race of complainants and respondents in Title IX cases, as well as in student discipline cases more generally.116 The near-universal answer was no.117 Most institutions indicated that they
keep no such data at all.118 A few said that they have the data but will not share
it.119
One can understand why universities might not wish to collect and publish
data concerning the demographics of students subjected to institutional discipline. Such data could prove embarrassing, and in the case of plaintiffs like Mr.
Doe, it could help lawyers build cases against the universities keeping the data.
To understand such a desire is not, however, to justify it. All sorts of institutions are required to maintain publicly-available data capable of causing institutional embarrassment and providing grist for the mill of the plaintiff’s bar. For
example, hospitals keep records of patient outcomes despite knowing that if data indicate an unusually high complication rate, patients may take future business elsewhere.120 As described above, elementary and secondary schools report discipline demographics to the DOE.121 The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration requires many employers to keep records of serious
work-related accidents and illnesses,122 creating reports that personal injury
lawyers may find valuable reading.123 The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) maintains the Adverse Event Reporting System, a database that tracks
adverse event and medication error reports to support the FDA’s postmarketing safety surveillance program for drug and therapeutic biologic prod-

116

Responses (hereinafter, “University Responses”) are on file with author.
See id.
118
See id.
119
See id. For public universities taking such a stance, the data may be available under state
open records laws, sometimes known as “sunshine laws.” For private universities, the data
are likely unavailable outside of the litigation discovery process.
120
Nir Menachemi & Taleah H. Collum, Benefits and Drawbacks of Electronic Health Record Systems, 4 RISK MGMT. & HEALTHCARE POL’Y 47, 47 (2011) (discussing impact of
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009,
which encouraged widespread use of electronic health records).
121
See generally, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION (CRDC), U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., supra
note 96.
122
See 29 C.F.R. 1904.0 (2017).
123
James B. Insco II, Five Issues Employers Should Consider with OSHA’s New Workplace
Injuries and Illnesses Reporting Rule, K&L GATES (June 21, 2016)
http://www.klgates.com/five-issues-employers-should-consider-with-oshas-new-workplaceinjuries-and-illnesses-reporting-rule-06-21-2016/ [https://perma.cc/TY7P-AGYB] (worrying
that new publication rule will put information “on the internet for any curious onlooker,
competitor, or personal injury lawyer”).
117
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ucts,124 which tort lawyers happen to find useful.125 The National Transportation Safety Board keeps records of aviation “accidents and incidents,”126 which
might assist in proving that a certain pilot is incompetent.
Universities committed to racial equality—which pretty much every university today purports to be—should immediately begin collecting and publishing demographic data that would allow outside observers to evaluate whether
the university discipline process has a disparate impact on the basis of race.127
If underlying records have not been destroyed, universities should also review
prior cases to assemble statistical data for the past several years, thereby
providing a baseline for measuring future results. Regardless of whether universities begin collecting data on their own, the U.S. Department of Education
should require the submission of such data by universities receiving federal
funds, thereby assuring near-universal compliance and uniform collection and
reporting methods.128
B. Implicit Bias Infects the Perceptions of Victims, other Witnesses,
Investigators, and Hearing Examiners and other Factfinders
“Implicit bias” is the talk of higher education, with professors scrambling
to study it and administrators racing to implement programs intended to reduce
its pernicious effects. A wealth of research convincingly demonstrates that even
well-meaning persons with no desire to exhibit racial animus nonetheless act
under the influence of unconscious biases that systemically affect others on the
basis of race.129 These biases affect access to higher education. In one study,
professors receiving unsolicited requests for advice were much more likely to

124

Questions and Answers on FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/Adver
seDrugEffects/default.htm [https://perma.cc/9H3S-98SV] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017) (noting that FDA uses data to create “quarterly reports on potential serious side effects identified
by FAERS”).
125
See In re Accutane Litig., Civ. Action No.: 271(MCL), 2015 WL 753674, at 23 (N.J. Super. Law Div. Feb. 20, 2015) (discussing plaintiff’s counsel’s use of FAERS data).
126
See generally, Aviation Accident Database & Synopses, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD,
https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx
[https://perma.cc/BX7K-WBCM]
(last visited Nov. 24, 2017). The Federal Aviation Administration keeps an additional database, the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system, that includes
incidents not investigated by the NTSB. See http://www.asias.faa.gov/pls/apex/f?p=100:1
[https://perma.cc/FG6Q-2L7D] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).
127
For further discussion of the sort of data that would be useful, see infra Section IV.A.
128
For more on what the DOE can require, as well as the laws granting DOE authority to do
so, see infra Section IV.A. at 42–43.
129
See, e.g., MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES
OF GOOD PEOPLE xii (2016); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); Damian
A. Stanley et al., Implicit Race Attitudes Predict Trustworthiness Judgments and Economic
Trust Decisions, 108 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 7710, 7710 (2011); Damian
Stanley et al., The Neural Basis of Implicit Attitudes, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI.
164, 164 (2008).
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respond to messages from white students than from students of other races.130
This basic finding, while frustrating, was, perhaps, not surprising. The researchers also reported two “counterintuitive” findings: First, “representation
does not reduce bias,” meaning that adding women and minorities to the faculty
did not in itself increase the opportunities available to women and minority students.131 Second, “there are no benefits to women of contacting female faculty
nor to Black or Hispanic students of contacting same-race faculty,” meaning
that faculty of all backgrounds exhibit biases that hurt underrepresented student
populations.132 Similar results appear in myriad studies.133
While universities loudly proclaim the importance of ethnic and other
forms of diversity, the implicit biases of faculty, staff, administrators, and students systemically hinder university efforts to promote diversity and inclusion.134 For example, implicit bias in the hiring process decreases the likelihood
of recruiting a diverse faculty.135 Student admissions,136 campus policing,137 and
130

The emails were sent by researchers and were identical other than the names of fictitious
senders, who were given names that accorded with racial stereotypes (such as “Lamar Washington” and “Brad Anderson”). See Katherine L. Milkman et al., What Happens Before? A
Field Experiment Exploring How Pay and Representation Differentially Shape Bias on the
Pathway into Organizations, 100 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1678, 1678, 1683 (2015).
131
Id. at 1704.
132
Id. Whether these results truly are “counterintuitive” is a question for another time. Similar phenomena have been observed in other contexts. See, e.g., Rima Abdelkader, NY Cabbie
Rep Defends Racial Profiling: ‘I’m Tired of Going to Funerals,’ THEGRIO (Dec. 8, 2010,
8:10 a.m.), http://thegrio.com/2010/12/08/ny-taxi-driver-rep-im-tired-of-going-to-funerals/
[https://perma.cc/S3FP-MXTK]; Paul LaRosa, Almost No More White NYC Cab Drivers, but
Blacks Still Can’t Catch a Ride?, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpo
st.com/paul-larosa/nyc-cab-drivers-blacks_b_6116602.html
[https://perma.cc/98HUADUM].
133
See, e.g., Donna K. Ginther et al., Race, Ethnicity, and NIH Research Awards, 333 SCI.
1015 (2011) (reporting that black scholars receive less generous grant funding); Frances Trix
& Carolyn Psenka, Exploring the Color of Glass: Letters of Recommendation for Female
and Male Medical Faculty, 14 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 191, 191 (2003) (reporting that women
receive inferior letters of recommendation).
134
See, e.g., Daniel Solórzano et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions, and
Campus Racial Climate: The Experiences of African American College Students, 69 J.
NEGRO EDUC. 60, 60 (2000); Derald Wing Sue et al., Racial Microaggressions and Difficult
Dialogues on Race in the Classroom, 15 CULTURAL DIVERSITY ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL.
183, 183 (2009).
135
See, e.g., BENJAMIN D. REESE, JR., IMPLICIT ASSOCIATIONS: THE SEARCH PROCESS (JULY
2013); REVIEWING APPLICANTS: RESEARCH ON BIAS AND ASSUMPTIONS, WOMEN SCI. &
ENGINEERING LEADERSHIP INST., U. OF WIS.-MADISON (2012).
136
See, e.g., Peter Schmidt, In Admission Decisions, the Deciders’ Own Backgrounds Play a
Big Role, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/InAdmission-Decisions-the/236088 [https://perma.cc/G7D7-FEAV] (describing study by Michael N. Bastedo & Nicholas A. Bowman).
137
See, e.g., Rio Fernandes, How Bias Training Works in One Campus Police Department,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., (May 16, 2016), http://chronicle.com/article/How-Bias-TrainingWorks-in-One/236482 [https://perma.cc/D9JC-FVDB] (“The adoption of anti-bias training is
not unusual among campus police forces across the country. . . .”).
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selection of campus administrators all are affected by the biases of decision
makers. Universities have responded to the dangers of implicit bias on several
fronts. Search committee members now receive training on how to identify and
resist implicit bias.138 Colleges give professors resources on how to “disrupt”
implicit bias in the classroom.139 Students attend trainings on “cultural competency.”140 At Ohio State University, the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race
and Ethnicity publishes State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review each year.
The institute also conducts trainings designed to lessen the impact of implicit
bias across the university (at OSU and elsewhere), with lessons related to admissions, classroom teaching, and broader culture.141 In short, the effects of
implicit bias on campus are pervasive, and thoughtful university leaders have
begun responding to well-recognized problems.
Anyone who has diligently ventured this far into this article can probably
predict my next query: What are the odds that implicit bias does not infect the
university disciplinary process? When examining real courts, scholars have
long recognized the effects of unconscious racial bias on witness testimony,142
and judges are increasingly open to expert testimony on this danger.143 Chances
are, witnesses do not lose their unconscious biases upon entry to university
property. Similarly, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges—even those outwardly committed to racial equality—exhibit racial biases that exacerbate the

138

I received the two pamphlets cited supra in note 135 when I joined the search committee
seeking a chancellor for the University of Missouri. See also Lucy A. Leske, How Search
Committees Can See Bias in Themselves, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., (Nov. 30, 2016),
http://www.chronicle.com/article/How-Search-Committees-Can-See/238532
[https://perma.cc/EB8K-XVRP]; Best Practices: Faculty and Leadership Searches, YALE U.
OFFICE PROVOST, 3 (2015) http://provost.yale.edu/sites/default/files/best_practices_for_cond
ucting_faculty_and_leadership_searches_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WH4F-M3AU] (“Best
Practices identifies factors that may interfere with the scholarly assessment of the candidate
and provides strategies to address them.”).
139
See, e.g., Disrupting Implicit Bias, DARTMOUTH CTR. ADVANCEMENT LEARNING
https://dcal.dartmouth.edu/resources/teaching-dartmouth/disrupting-implicit-bias
[https://perma.cc/F3FZ-N9YN] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).
140
See, e.g., Vernita Bediako, Citizenship@Mizzou Encourages Diversity, Inclusion at
Monday Evening Event, MANEATER (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.themaneater.com/stories/20
17/1/31/citizenshipmizzou-encourages-diversity-inclusion-m [https://perma.cc/RGV4-GE
77]; Kara Guzman, Cultural Competency Training Aims to Help Foster an Inclusive Culture,
U. C. SANTA CRUZ NEWSCENTER (Sept. 28, 2016), http://news.ucsc.edu/2016/09/culturalcompetency-students.html [https://perma.cc/4RB2-VZ6P].
141
See generally About, OHIO ST. U. KIRWAN INST. STUD. RACE ETHNICITY at
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/about [https://perma.cc/SUT5-MHEU] (last visited Nov. 24,
2017) (describing research and outreach efforts).
142
See generally Laura Connelly, Cross-Racial Identifications: Solutions to the “They All
Look Alike” Effect, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 125 (2015); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial
Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984).
143
See State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 720–21, 723 (Conn. 2012); State v. Henderson, 27
A.3d 872, 917, 925 (N.J. 2011).
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injustice of the criminal court system.144 Scholars have documented race and
sex biases in sexual harassment and assault proceedings.145 Chances are, Title
IX office staff and other university officials possess similar biases, with similar
results.
In particular, when universities police sexual activity near the border of
permissible and impermissible conduct, they magnify the dangers of implicit
biases held by victims and other witnesses.146 In the case of a “stranger rape,”
there is generally less confusion about whether a crime occurred; the issue is
identifying the perpetrator. In the more common case of dorm room sexual activity about which consent is disputed, cross-racial perceptions of dangerousness and innocence on the part of witnesses can bring racial bias into the hearing room. Similarly, for adjudications concerning university rules against
behavior like harassment and sexual stalking—in which the subjective perceptions of alleged victims are often elements of the offense—racialized perceptions about whose sexual interest is legitimate and appropriate affect what conduct is reported and how investigators will perceive it.
C. Definitions of Offenses Are Broad and Vague
University definitions of offenses such as sexual harassment are often both
broad and vague, giving immense discretion to Title IX officials who decide
which students to charge. This parallels offenses for which black students are
disproportionately punished in elementary and secondary schools, such as “disrespect,” “excessive noise,” and “defiance.”147
Among other terms, “sexual harassment” and “stalking” can have broad
definitions that include a great deal of conduct that many students might not
expect to be prohibited. Campus definitions of sexual assault, which generally
include sexual activity performed without consent, also cover conduct not included in traditional criminal law definitions of rape and sexual assault, causing
sexual activity that would be perfectly lawful if performed off campus by nonstudents to become punishable if performed by students.148 This discrepancy
results from campus definitions of consent that require more robust evidence of
assent than is normally required in sex crime prosecutions, or even in civil liti144

See L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Criminal Courtroom, 126 YALE L.J. 862, 867–69 (2017) (reviewing Nicole Van Cleve, Crook County: Racism and Injustice in America’s Largest Criminal Court (2016)).
145
See Nicole E. Smith, The Old College Trial: Evaluating the Investigative Model for Adjudicating Claims of Sexual Misconduct, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 953, 970–71 (2017); Karl L.
Wuensch et al., Racial Bias in Decisions Made by Mock Jurors Evaluating a Case of Sexual
Harassment, 142 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 587, 594 (2002).
146
The danger is further magnified by the language of university codes containing offenses
with broad and vague definitions. See infra Section III.C.
147
See Skiba et al., supra note 48 (finding that racial disparities are greater for offenses
more “subjective in interpretation,” as opposed to more concrete violations like “smoking”
and “vandalism”); see also Skiba supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
148
See infra Section III.C.3.
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gation related to nonconsensual sex.149 This Subpart discusses three examples
of campus offenses: sexual harassment, stalking, and sexual assault. It then recounts some lawsuits brought by students who challenged the imposition of
campus discipline on the grounds that campus offenses are unduly broad or
vague.
1. Sexual Harassment
Campus definitions of sexual harassment, if given their plain meaning, can
cover totally innocuous conduct that could hardly be described as depriving
someone of her equal access to educational opportunities.
For example, at the University of Texas, “sexual harassment” includes
“[u]nwelcome conduct of a sexual nature . . . intentionally directed towards a
specific individual . . . [with the] effect of . . . creating an . . . offensive atmosphere.”150 By its terms, a single sexual advance that creates such an (undefined)
offensive atmosphere could subject a student to discipline.151
Clemson University defines “Sexual harassment” as “unwelcome conduct
of a sexual nature,” and explains that the definition “includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical
conduct of a sexual nature including sexual violence.”152 If taken literally, the
definition includes flirtation that is merely unwelcome—even if it causes no
harm.
At Syracuse University, sexual harassment until recently was defined as
“unwelcome behavior of a sexual nature that relates to the gender or sexual
identity of an individual.”153 University rules provided that “[e]ven without creating an intimidating or hostile environment for study, work, or social living,
unwelcome behavior of a sexual nature is a violation.”154 Syracuse thus went
149

Id.
See Univ. of Texas at Austin, Prohibition of Sexual Discrimination, Sexual Harassment,
Sexual Assault, Sexual Misconduct, Interpersonal Violence, and Stalking,
https://policies.utexas.edu/policies/prohibition-sexual-discrimination-sexual-harassmentsexual-assault-sexual-misconduct [https://perma.cc/4DNE-4FSU] (last visited Nov. 24,
2017).
151
A separate section listing examples of what “sexual harassment may include” suggests
that the “frequency and severity” of “verbal conduct” may affect whether speech constitutes
sexual harassment. Id. But that is far from clear, and neither frequency nor severity is included in the definition of the offense.
152
See
Clemson
Univ.,
Anti-Harassment
and
Non-Discrimination
Policy,
http://www.clemson.edu/campus-life/campus-services/access/anti-harassment-policy.html
[https://perma.cc/34BG-R2PW] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).
153
See Syracuse University Information Regarding Sexual Misconduct and Other Types of
Harassment and Discrimination, http://earthsciences.syr.edu/academics/PDFs/SU%20Info%
20Sexual%20misconduct%20and%20other.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6RB-K446] (last visited
Nov. 24, 2017). Current policy uses different language. See Sexual Harassment, Abuse, and
Assault Prevention, Syracuse Univ. Policies, http://supolicies.syr.edu/studs/sexual_harass.
htm [https://perma.cc/TU5W-7QL6] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).
154
See Syracuse University Information, supra note 153.
150
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beyond Texas and Clemson, both of which merely allowed speculation (perhaps unwarranted) that their codes of conduct might subject students to discipline for isolated acts of harmless, unwelcome flirtation.
In disclaiming the need for a hostile environment, Syracuse echoed the
language of the U.S Department of Justice’s letter to the University of New
Mexico, which chastised the university for saying otherwise.155 According to
the DOJ letter, New Mexico’s “policies mistakenly indicate[d] that unwelcome
conduct of a sexual nature does not constitute sexual harassment until it causes
a hostile environment or unless it is quid pro quo.”156 The letter continued,
“[u]nwelcome conduct of a sexual nature, however, constitutes sexual harassment regardless of whether it causes a hostile environment or is quid pro
quo.”157 To support this interpretation, the DOJ letter quoted from DOE Office
for Civil Rights (OCR) guidance contained in a 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter.
Indeed, federal guidance defines sexual harassment as “unwelcome conduct of a
sexual nature. It includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature, such as
sexual assault or acts of sexual violence.”
Hostile environment is not part of the definition of sexual harassment, nor is it
required for “unwanted conduct of a sexual nature to be deemed sexual harassment.”158

Taken together, the DOJ and DOE guidance provide that some “verbal . . .
conduct of a sexual nature” can constitute sexual harassment under university
regulations even if it does not cause a hostile environment.159 Indeed, some
such conduct must constitute sexual harassment if a university wishes to avoid
federal sanctions.
Further, in the event that creating a “hostile environment” remains an element of “sexual harassment,” the term “hostile environment” must itself be defined. An overbroad definition of “hostile environment” eliminates the benefits
that might come from the phrase’s retention, and federal regulators have stated
that broad definitions are required. In their compliance letter to the University
of Montana, the DOJ and DOE OCR demanded expansion of the “sexual har-

155

See Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. to President Robert G. Frank,
Univ. of N.M. 2 (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/843901/download
[https://perma.cc/WXF7-CEFM].
156
See id. at 9.
157
Id. (emphasis added).
158
Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t Educ. Office for Civil Rights, “Dear Colleague” Letter (Apr. 4,
2011) http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.html [https://per
ma.cc/9UKC-77LU]); see also Comm. A on Acad. Freedom & Tenure & Comm. on Women
in the Acad. Profession, supra note 13, at 77. On September 22, 2017, U.S. Dep’t Educ. Rescinded the April 4, 2011 “Dear Colleague” guidance document. See U.S. Dep’t Educ. Office for Civil Rights, “Dear Colleague” letter (Sept. 22, 2017). OCR also issued some interim
guidance on the same day. See id.
159
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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assment” definition used at that institution.160 The university had defined “hostile environment” as being “severe and pervasive,” and the federal regulators
wrote that the phrase must be replaced with “severe or pervasive.”161 The regulators also stated that the Montana agreement “will serve as a blueprint for colleges and universities throughout the country to protect students from sexual
harassment and assault.”162
Based on this guidance, it no longer seems far-fetched to suggest that UT
Austin or Clemson might punish a single unwanted sexual advance that turns
out to be somewhat offensive as sexual harassment.163 Even if university officials have no intention of doing so, a student could be excused for fearing the
worst.
2. Stalking
The term “stalking,” as commonly used in statutes, generally refers to a
course of conduct directed at another person that the perpetrator knows (or
should have known) would cause the victim reasonable fear for her safety or
the safety of another.164 State court opinions provide guidance concerning what
constitutes a reasonable fear and how much evidence is necessary to establish
the required culpable mental state. Campus definitions, however, can cover far
less serious conduct.
In Arizona, for example, criminal law defines stalking in a fairly standard
way, covering “a course of conduct that is directed toward another person . . .
[when] that conduct causes the victim” serious emotional harm or a reasonable
fear of physical injury or damage to property.165
At the University of Arizona, by contrast, the list of prohibited behavior in
the student code of conduct includes, “Stalking or engaging in repeated or significant behavior toward another individual, whether in person, in writing, or
through electronic means, after having been asked to stop, or doing so to such a
degree that a reasonable person, subject to such contact, would regard the con160

Letter from U.S. Dep’t Justice Civil Rights Div. & U.S. Dep’t Educ. Office for Civil
Rights to President Royce Engstrom, Univ. of Mont. (May 9, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2013/05/09/um-ltr-findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF53-SC7F];
see also Comm. A on Acad. Freedom & Tenure & Comm. on Women in the Acad. Profession, supra note 13, at 77.
161
See U.S. Dep’t Just. Civil Rights Div. & U.S. Dep’t Ed. Office for Civil Rights, supra
note 160, at 5 (emphasis added). The compliance letter demanded this change despite U.S.
Supreme Court precedent using the “severe and pervasive” language, stating that subsequent
agency guidance had superseded the Court’s interpretation of the statute. See id. at 5 nn.8, 9.
162
Id.; see Richard Hanley, Title IX, Sexual Harassment, and Academic Freedom: What No
One Seems to Understand, 6 AAUP J. ACAD. FREEDOM 1, 3 (2015) (decrying the Montana
agreement and its use as a “blueprint”).
163
See supra text accompanying notes 150-151.
164
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2923 (2016); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (2008); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 120.45 (2014).
165
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2923 (2016).
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tact as unwanted.”166 Under this definition, even if a student has never been
asked to stop or been told his behavior is problematic, the student can violate
the university code if a reasonable person would consider the behavior “unwanted.” No objective or subjective fear of harm, much less actual harm, is required before the school may impose discipline for apparently “unwanted” acts.
A more thorough analysis of Missouri law, both in statute and in campus
rules, illustrates how a broad university “stalking” definition can encompass
conduct well outside the definitions applied by real courts to offenses with the
same name.
The University of Missouri defines “Stalking on the Basis of Sex” as “following or engaging in a course of conduct on the basis of sex with no legitimate purpose that makes another person reasonably concerned for their safety
or would cause a reasonable person under the circumstances to be frightened,
intimidated or emotionally distressed.”167 Neither “legitimate purpose” nor
“emotionally distressed” are defined.168
Missouri statutory law uses similar definitions of stalking in other contexts,
both to define stalking crimes and to explain when courts may issue orders of
protection against stalkers. The criminal offense of stalking in the second degree is defined as follows: “A person commits the offense of stalking in the second degree if he or she purposely, through his or her course of conduct, disturbs, or follows with the intent to disturb another person.”169 The term
“disturb” means “to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person
that serves no legitimate purpose and that would cause a reasonable person under the circumstances to be frightened, intimidated, or emotionally distressed.”170
A person who wonders just what constitutes “stalking” in Missouri but is
unsatisfied with the definitions above need not despair. Missouri courts have
helped to explain the statutory language through case law. For example, in
State v. Magalif, the Missouri Court of Appeals noted that the state “General
Assembly did not define ‘substantial emotional distress’ in § 565.225,” then
proceeded to adopt a definition from another statute, and then quoted approv166

See STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT 5-308(F)(20) (UNIV. of ARIZ., 2015),
http://www.titleix.arizona.edu/code_of_student_conduct
[https://perma.cc/82WD-N49W]
(last visited Nov. 24, 2017). Confusingly, the code also contains another definition of stalking more similar to the criminal statute. See id. at (E)(18). The university quotes the broader
offense definition in an online listing of student conduct violations that “may be applicable
to Title IX-related concerns.” See id.
167
See COLLECTED RULES & REG. 600.020(B)(4) (UNIV. of MO., 2017), https://www.umsyst
em.edu/ums/rules/collected_rules/equal_employment_educational_opportunity/ch600/600.0
20_sex_discrimination_sexual_harassment_and_sexual_misconduct [https://perma.cc/5DKD
-K972].
168
In the university’s defense, the Missouri criminal statutes defining “stalking” use the
same language. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.227, 565.225 (effective Aug. 28, 2017).
169
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.227.1. (effective Aug. 28, 2017).
170
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.225.1. (effective Aug. 28, 2017).
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ingly from a court decision construing the statute from which it adopted the
definition.171 The court held that to satisfy the statutory definition, the defendant’s conduct “must be such as would produce a considerable or significant
amount of emotional distress in a reasonable person; something markedly
greater than the level of uneasiness, nervousness, unhappiness or the like which
are commonly experienced in day to day living.”172 And in State v. Martin, the
Court of Appeals rejected a defendant’s effort to define “substantial emotional
distress” in a way that would require “a substantial risk of temporary or permanent medical or psychological damage, manifested by impairment of a behavioral, cognitive or physical condition,” holding that the crime of stalking included conduct with less severe effects.173 With these and other cases,174
prosecutors, police officers, and ordinary citizens can—with some effort—
predict what conduct is covered by the statute and can conform their conduct
accordingly. Even without accepting the legal fiction that everyone is aware of
the law, including judicial glosses on statutory terms, one can appreciate the
benefit that reasoned court opinions provide.
The term “stalking” has importance beyond the criminal court; judges must
apply it when deciding whether to issue orders of protection against accused
stalkers. For this purpose, Missouri defines “stalking” as “when any person
purposely engages in an unwanted course of conduct that causes alarm to another person, or a person who resides together in the same household with the
person seeking the order of protection when it is reasonable in that person’s situation to have been alarmed by the conduct.”175 Because the distinction between stalking and annoying-yet-lawful behavior is not always obvious, Missouri courts have repeatedly differentiated between stalking and behavior that
causes “the level of uneasiness, nervousness, unhappiness or the like which are
commonly experienced in day to day living,” holding that the second category
does not justify issuance of protective orders.176 For example, “Repeated com171

See State v. Magalif, 131 S.W.3d 431, 435–36 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). The Magalif court
was interpreting slightly different language than that in the current statute. See State v. Joyner, 458 S.W.3d 875, 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that “prior to 2008, the State had to
prove that a defendant’s course of conduct in fact caused a victim to suffer ‘substantial emotional distress’ [rather than mere “emotional distress”], after 2008, the State was relieved of
this burden). Its reasoning could nonetheless be instructive.
172
Magalif, 131 S.W.3d at 435–36 (quoting Wallace v. Van Pelt, 969 S.W.2d 380, 385–86
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998)). This definition has continued to be quoted in Missouri court opinions
after the 2008 amendment mentioned supra note 171. See, e.g., Lawyer v. Fino, 459 S.W.3d
528, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
173
See State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d 6, 8–9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
174
See, e.g., Overstreet v. Kixmiller, 120 S.W.3d 257, 258 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing
what activity is “legitimate”); Girard v. Girard, 54 S.W.3d 203, 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(same); State v. Baker, 40 S.W.3d 392, 395 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing “emotional distress”).
175
MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010(14) (effective Aug. 28, 2016).
176
See, e.g., Lawyer, 459 S.W.3d at 532; Brockert v. Syler, 95 S.W.3d 187, 193 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2003).
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munication alone . . . typically does not rise to the level of harassment because,
while annoying and boorish, such conduct would not cause substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person.”177
The discussion above illustrates that in real Missouri courts, whether criminal court or family court, persons accused of “stalking” have ample case law
with which they can compare their conduct to that already reviewed by judges
applying state statutes. By contrast, in the university disciplinary system, a student accused of stalking would discover an offense lacking definitions for key
terms such as “legitimate purpose.”178 Then, because the records of prior campus cases are confidential and in any event lack the sort of reasoned statutory
analysis useful in defining ambiguous terms, the accused would have no case
law available to resolve his confusion. As a result, the practical definition of
“stalking” on campus is largely at the discretion of university staff. Further,
Missouri is not special in this regard; I chose the example because I live here
and have some familiarity with its criminal statutes. If one chooses some other
state at random, state courts there are nearly certain to have defined “stalking”
at length in a variety of contexts, and university officials are nearly certain not
to have done so in any documents accessible to most persons regulated by university codes of conduct.
3. Sexual Misconduct, Sexual Assault, and Rape
Broad definitions also plague the most serious campus sexual offenses, including sexual misconduct, sexual assault, and rape. In a recent New York case,
for example, the issue before a hearing board at SUNY Potsdam was whether a
sexual encounter between students was consensual.179 Because the university’s
code of conduct prohibits “[a]ny sexual act that occurs without the consent of
the victim or that occurs when the victim is unable to give consent,”180 and consent was disputed, the hearing board applied the code’s definition of consent.
Stating that consent cannot be inferred from silence or mere lack of objection,
the code requires that consent be shown with “spoken words or behavior that
indicates, without doubt to either party, a mutual agreement to” engage in sexual activity.181 This definition of consent is quite narrow compared to those traditionally applied by courts in sex crime cases.182 As a result, a great deal of conduct that could not be punished criminally—even if there were no questions of

177

See Lawyer, 459 S.W.3d at 532 (collecting cases).
See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
179
See Haug v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 149 A.D.3d 1200, 1202 (N.Y. App. Div.
2017).
180
See SUNY POTSDAM, STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT 18, 22, 25 (2014).
181
See Haug, 149 A.D.3d at 1201.
182
See generally State v. Jones, 299 P.3d 219, 229 (Idaho 2013) (reviewing development of
rape law in recent decades, particularly the “resistance requirement”); RICHARD J. BONNIE ET
AL., CRIMINAL LAW 725–30 (4th ed. 2015).
178
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proving what occurred—violates the university rules governing sex between
students.183
Reasonable minds may differ concerning how colleges should regulate sex
on campus.184 It is beyond debate, however, that many campuses prohibit sexual activity that would be perfectly lawful if conducted outside the reach of university rules. This should not cause surprise. Advocates have sought changes to
university regulation of campus sex precisely because they disliked existing
rules that more closely mirrored criminal law.185 The resulting broader definitions of prohibited sexual activity then apply on campus to offenses with familiar names like “sexual assault” that upon inspection are quite different from offenses with such names that might be adjudicated in real courts. A brief essay
by Brett A. Sokolow and Daniel C. Swinton illustrates the confusion that occasionally results.186 Sokolow and Swinton are consultants at the NCHERM
Group, which travels the country helping universities (at great expense) conform their sex regulations to the suggestions of the Department of Education.187
The group coordinates with ATIXA, the Association of Title IX Administrators, to advise universities on how to address campus sexual misconduct.188 In
their analysis of a Tennessee case in which a state judge reversed a university’s
expulsion decision,189 Sokolow and Swinton observed that “[a]ffirmative consent (or consent as we call it) in the sexual context is a concept somewhat foreign to legal circles and that foreignness is apparent in the Chancery Court’s
decision.”190 Sokolow and Swinton also noted that the university’s definition of
affirmative consent, “words or actions unmistakable in their meaning,” while a
183

See N.Y. Penal Law § 130.05 (McKinney 2013) (defining “lack of consent” and stating
that even if “not specifically stated, it is an element of every [sexual] offense . . . that the
sexual act was committed without consent of the victim.”).
184
See Ian Urbina, The Challenge of Defining Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/sunday-review/being-clear-about-rape.html
[https://perma.cc/7SKG-XX47] (discussing adoption of “yes means yes” standard at public
universities in New York and California).
185
See, e.g., Nancy Chi Cantalupo, For the Title IX Civil Rights Movement: Congratulations
and Cautions, 125 YALE L.J. F. 281, 301 (2016) (suggesting that “the victories of the Title
IX movement thus far could be leveraged to press for direct changes and reform of consent
standards in state criminal codes”).
186
Brett A. Sokolow & Daniel C. Swinton, Response to Corey Mock v. Univ. of Tennessee,
Chattanooga, NCHERM GROUP (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.ncherm.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/TNG-TOW-08-172015-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M6Q-22Z2].
187
NCHERM stands for National Center for Higher Education Risk Management. See, e.g.,
Ashley Jost, UM System Paying Almost $500,000 for Title IX Consultation, Development,
COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Sept. 8, 2014, 12:01 AM) http://www.columbiatribune.com/a45c757c7e70-50c7-95d6-a8a9657dbba1.html [https://perma.cc/8ZUR-LJS5].
188
See NCHERM GROUP, https://www.ncherm.org [https://perma.cc/R8Q3-ETVJ] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017) (“The NCHERM Group and ATIXA have developed an approach called
the One Policy, One Process Model . . .”).
189
See Mock v. Univ. of Tenn. at Chattanooga, No. 14-1687-II at 23 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Aug. 4,
2015).
190
See Sokolow & Swinton, supra note 186.
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“formulation . . . popular on some campuses,” is “unwise in a policy context”
because little in the sexual context is “unmistakable.”191 One might observe that
higher education consultants have a financial interest in observing that a “popular” definition of campus sexual misconduct exposes universities to liability
risks that could shrink with the right sort of help from outside experts. A less
cynical takeaway is that even in the eyes of reform advocates who champion
“affirmative consent” as campus policy, many universities use overly narrow
definitions of consent, which means that they have overly broad definitions of
nonconsensual sex, which justifies expulsion when found.192
In addition to breadth, definitions of sexual misconduct may also suffer
from vagueness similar to that already discussed for the offenses of sexual harassment and stalking. In Doe v. Western New England University, the court
considered a case brought by a student a university found to have “pressur[ed]
[another] for sex in violation” of university rules.193 The court concluded, “At a
minimum, the [university] Handbook’s standards regarding coercion are ambiguous.”194
4. Litigation Related to Offense Definitions
Some students have brought legal challenges to the language of university
behavior codes, thereby exposing them to judicial scrutiny and causing some to
be stricken as unenforceable.195 It appears that despite court rulings dating at
least to 1989, many university codes contain offenses with definitions incompatible with the First Amendment and other constitutional guarantees.196
In addition, the expansive definitions applied by university officials to ambiguous student conduct provisions makes litigation more likely than would
more judicious interpretation. Unlike actual statutes, which, if ambiguous, can
occasionally be understood with greater precision after reading court opinions,
university codes of conduct lack a body of case law to which a student or his
lawyer might turn. Instead, interpretation is vested in university officials, often
191

Id.
Even an “affirmative consent” standard does not prohibit enough campus sex for some
advocates. See, e.g., Cantalupo, supra note 185, at 298 (quoting approvingly federal guidance to the effect that “[a]cquiescence in the conduct” is not enough to prove “welcomeness,” which is described as a better standard for campus sex regulation).
193
See Doe v. W. New England Univ., 228 F. Supp. 3d 154, 174, (D. Mass. 2017).
194
Id. Additional instances of ambiguous conduct offenses appear in the next section.
195
DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 305, 317, 320 (3d Cir. 2008); UWM Post, Inc. v.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1180 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (finding
university policy overbroad and applicable to protected speech); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721
F. Supp. 852, 853, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (finding that university’s anti-harassment policy
“swept within its scope a significant amount of ‘verbal conduct’ or ‘verbal behavior’ which
is unquestionably protected speech under the First Amendment.”).
196
See Benjamin Dower, The Scylla of Sexual Harassment and the Charybdis of Free
Speech: How Public Universities Can Craft Policies to Avoid Liability, 31 REV. LITIG. 703,
728 (2012).
192
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without legal training, who make ad hoc decisions with no precedential authority. Occasionally, these interpretations receive judicial review during litigation
related to a student discipline case.
In Doe v. Amherst College, for example, an expelled student questioned
whether a student handbook definition of sexual misconduct “include[d] a
knowledge requirement,” asking in particular whether a student who was
“blacked out” drunk could possess the needed culpable mental state.197 Doe’s
argument was that because he was blacked out, he was not capable of committing sexual misconduct and was, if anything, a victim of the less-intoxicated
woman with whom he engaged in sexual activity.198 At the motion-to-dismiss
stage,
the
court
held
that
Doe’s
“proposed
reading
of
the Policy and Procedures is not unreasonable” and allowed him to proceed
with his breach of contract claim concerning alleged misinterpretation of the
Amherst College sexual misconduct definition.199
In Mock v. University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, a Tennessee court set
aside a student’s expulsion in part because, according to the judge, the university misapplied its definition of “consent.”200 Among other concerns, the judge
noted that the university chancellor appeared to rely upon articles promoting
the use of a consent definition different from that in the university rules.201
An older case, decided before modern Title IX enforcement at universities
was underway, illustrates how well-meaning administrators can violate students’ rights while pursuing gender equity.202 In 1991, a fraternity chapter at
George Mason University—a public university in Virginia—performed a skit
offensive to women and minority students (as well as to those who appreciate
quality skits).203 The university received student complaints and decided that
the fraternity’s “behavior had created a hostile learning environment for women
and blacks, incompatible with the University’s mission.”204 GMU then punished the fraternity by prohibiting most of its social activities and requiring it
“to plan and implement an educational program addressing cultural differences,
diversity, and the concerns of women.”205 A United States District Judge and a
197

See Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 216 (D. Mass. 2017).
Id. at 224. Because the female student was less drunk than Doe, and the college chose to
charge him with misconduct while not charging her with taking advantage of Doe’s incapacitation, Doe alleged gender discrimination.
199
Id. at 218.
200
Mock v. Univ. of Tenn. at Chattanooga, No. 14-1687-II at 20 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Aug. 4,
2015).
201
See id. at 19–20.
202
See Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 393
(4th Cir. 1993) (holding that university engaged in unlawful viewpoint discrimination when
punishing student group).
203
See id. at 387–88 (describing skit as well as fraternity’s subsequent admission that it
“was sophomoric and offensive”).
204
Id. at 388.
205
Id.
198
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unanimous three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals then agreed that the skit,
while “an exercise of teenage campus excess,” was protected by the First
Amendment and could not justify punishment by the university.206 While it is
possible that GMU’s decision was motivated by the desire of bluenoses to suppress free expression, I suspect that instead, university officials happened to
pursue legitimate goals (such as promoting an inclusive environment and opposing sexism and racism) in an unlawful manner. The Fourth Circuit observed, “The University certainly has a substantial interest in maintaining an
educational environment free of discrimination and racism, and in providing
gender-neutral education. Yet it seems equally apparent that it has available
numerous alternatives to imposing punishment on students based on the viewpoints they express.”207 Now, as then, university officials applying vague and
broad campus regulations may well violate student rights.
D. The Process Is Conducted in Secret
If sunshine is the best disinfectant,208 university tribunals need substantial
doses of hydrogen peroxide. For perfectly sensible reasons—including student
privacy rights protected by FERPA—interested parties may not sashay into
university disciplinary hearings to assess the acumen of hearing examiners.209
This restriction comes at a cost, however. If a student is treated unfairly, outside observers will not have the chance to see and object.210 Opacity compounds at those universities choosing neither to produce word-for-word transcripts of their proceedings nor to make recordings.
After the hearing, when some university official decides whether the accused is “responsible” and, if so, what punishment to impose, no written opinion will announce the result to the public. As a result, one cannot learn what the
normal or standard punishment is for various wrongs.211 This creates particular
206

Id. at 389, 393; Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 773 F.
Supp. 792, 795 (E.D. Va. 1991).
207
Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity, 993 F.3d at 393.
208
See Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY. (Dec. 20, 1913) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”).
209
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
210
Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial”).
211
An annual report listing punishments imposed for various offenses is not especially helpful. Because the offenses are defined so broadly and vaguely, one cannot guess from the bare
naming of an offense what a particular student did to become guilty of “harassment” or
“sexual stalking.” See, e.g., UNIV. OF MO., TITLE IX OFFICE, MU TITLE IX OFFICE ANNUAL
REPORT 27 (Sept. 17, 2015) (describing results of cases in general terms and stating, “[w]hen
found responsible, Respondents were sanctioned by suspension from the University or other
discretionary sanctions.”). Even a more robust report, such as that from Yale, does not allow
apples-to-apples comparisons of cases. See, e.g., YALE UNIV., REPORT OF COMPLAINTS OF
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 13 (Dec. 31, 2016) (“A G&P student reported that a faculty member
made inappropriate comments and made unwanted physical contact with the complainant . . .
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challenges when students found guilty must debate with the Title IX office
about what punishment is appropriate. A few examples of university policies
setting forth potential sanctions will illustrate the difficulty.
At Clemson, students are informed that those “found to be in violation of
[university] policy will be subject to immediate and appropriate disciplinary
action, proportional to the seriousness of the offense. . . . Possible sanctions include but are not limited to reprimand, disciplinary probation, suspension, or
dismissal.”212 At Nebraska, “Institutional sanctions that may be imposed
against students for sexual misconduct range from warning to expulsion.”213
Unlike in real courts, where sentences are generally cabined by statutory maximums that vary by offense, university authorities commonly receive little
guidance on what punishment fits what offense.214
Constraints on discretion exist largely in what could be described as a sort
of common law of prior decisions, remembered with varying degrees of accuracy by a small portion of those involved in the process. In my own undergraduate days, I served on the Yale College Executive Committee, which heard student disciplinary cases. It was common for students caught dead to rights to, in
effect, “plead guilty” by admitting a violation and then come before the committee only for imposition of sanction. In my experience, the dean’s office secretary who informed the committee what had been done in similar prior cases
was among the most powerful persons in the room, despite having no vote.
Because the range of possible punishment is so broad, a student accused of
sexual harassment or misconduct might wish to read detailed descriptions of
the conduct previously punished by the university. Beyond giving the student a
sense of what may be in store for him, this information could help the student
articulate arguments about what sanction is appropriate in his case. As described above, however, this information is normally not available. After a sentence is imposed, the lack of comparators will hinder the student’s ability to
appeal on the theory that his punishment is outside the norm for similar behavior.215 Although some university codes explicitly list this potential ground for
After consulting with the complainant, the Title IX coordinator counseled the respondent on
appropriate conduct.”).
212
See Clemson Univ., supra note 152 at 9.
213
See UNIV. OF NEB., SEXUAL MISCONDUCT POLICY, 3 (2014), https://nebraska.edu/docs/hr/
NU_Sexual_Misconduct_Policy_2014_0530.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J83-XRE7].
214
See, e.g., UNIV. OF MO. SYS., COLLECTED RULES & REGULATIONS, § 600.030(Q)(1)(b)
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.umsystem.edu/ums/rules/collected_rules/equal_employment_ed
ucational_opportunity/ch600/600.030_equity_resolution_process_for_resolving_complaints
_of_harassment [https://perma.cc/76M9-LPJM].
215
See, e.g., id. § (S)(1)(c) (listing as potential ground for appeal that “sanctions fall outside
the range typically imposed for this offense, or for the cumulative conduct record of the Respondent”); COLL. OF WESTCHESTER, TITLE IX POLICY PROHIBITING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AND
SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT,
https://www.cw.edu/prohibition-sexual-discrimination
[https://perma.cc/XD98-65D2] (including same ground for appeal); N. ILL. UNIV., TITLE
IX/SEXUAL MISCONDUCT POLICY AND COMPLAINT PROCEDURES FOR EMPLOYEES AND
STUDENTS (Dec. 1, 2016), http://niu.edu/sexualmisconduct/overview/TitleIX-Sexual-
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appeal, the promise is empty without access to sealed case files or, at a minimum, some redacted version of case files that allows comparisons.
Predictions that discipline records might prove difficult to obtain have
proven accurate when activists and litigators have sought access.216 The University of Kentucky successfully sued its student newspaper to prevent reporters from seeing records related to allegations against James Harwood, a former
faculty member accused of sexually assaulting students.217 The court held that
even if records were redacted to remove the names of complainants and other
identifying details, release would violate student privacy law.218 Other universities have similarly refused to release records in high-profile cases—such as the
Baylor University investigation that led to the dismissal of its president and
head football coach—arguing that student records are exempt from disclosure.219 Relatedly, male students alleging that student disciplinary processes are
biased against men have struggled to prove disparate treatment because they
cannot access records of “female comparators” accused of misconduct.220 Although some courts have allowed such claims to reach discovery,221 others have
deemed “the absence of specific factual allegations from which a factfinder
could plausibly infer the influence of gender bias on the outcome of Plaintiff’s
disciplinary proceeding” to be a fatal weakness.222
Misconduct-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/TA2X-JLWE] (“The sanction(s) is/are inappropriate or disproportionate to the determined finding(s)”); BOS. UNIV., STUDENT SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT PROCEDURES (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.bu.edu/safety/sexual-misconduct/titleix-bu-policies/student-sexual-misconduct-procedures [https://perma.cc/DMN3-PQHF] (“The
sanction imposed is disproportionate to the violation”).
216
See Jake New, Protecting Student Privacy, or Reputation?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 25,
2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/01/25/judge-sides-university-kentuckylawsuit-against-student-newspaper-over-sexual [https://perma.cc/4U96-V9ZF].
217
See id.; Paidin Dermody, Judge Rules in Favor of UK in Harwood Open Records Case,
KY. KERNEL (Jan. 24, 2017) http://www.kykernel.com/news/judge-rules-in-favor-of-uk-inharwood-open-records/article_b4a9a306-e25f-11e6-a83c-73ddde751caf.html [https://perma.
cc/G3PM-3GCR].
218
See Univ. of Ky. v. Kernel Press, Inc., No. 16-CI-3229 at 10 (Fayette Cir. Ct. Jan. 23,
2017).
219
See New, supra note 216.
220
See, e.g., Doe v. Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 185, 186 (D. R.I. 2016) (discussing
what qualifies as “ ‘particular circumstances suggesting that gender bias was a motivating
factor behind the erroneous finding’ ” and noting that “absent any female comparators at the
pleading stage,” courts have sometimes granted motions to dismiss); see also Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1994).
221
See, e.g., Doe v. Colum. Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that public criticism of university and pressure for tougher enforcement supports inference of sex discrimination); Neal v. Colo. State Univ.-Pueblo, No. 16-CV-873-RM-CBS, 2017 WL 633045, at
*9–*14 (D. Colo. Feb. 16, 2017) (Mag. recommendation) (recommending against dismissal
of plaintiff’s claim and collecting cases addressing this issue).
222
See Doe v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 240 F. Supp. 3d 984, 991–93 (D. Minn. 2017); Doe v.
Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, No. 14-30143-MGM, 2015 WL 4306521, at *9 (D. Mass. July 14,
2015); Doe v. Colum. Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d 356, 374–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d 831 F.3d
46 (2d Cir. 2016).
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If journalists investigating the Baylor football team have failed to obtain
student conduct records of tremendous interest to sports fans, and plaintiffs’
lawyers have failed to find “female comparators” to support their client’s gender-discrimination claims, one can safely assume that the average college student cannot possibly know what happens at her institution. Nor can faculty
who, armed with sufficient data, might participate in “shared governance” related to student discipline.
E. Procedures Are Informal and Not Uniform
Although some campus Title IX offices are surely models of professionalism, and some universities run excellent hearings that protect the rights of
complainants and accused students alike, not every campus boasts a combination of investigation and adjudication that gives confidence in the likelihood of
fair results. For example, some universities have procedures giving accused
students minimal time to review discovery before their hearings.223 Some universities prohibit students from bringing lawyers to their hearings, and others
allow lawyers to attend but disallow them from speaking.224 Hearsay is freely
admitted, with university investigators reporting about interviews of absent
witnesses whom the accused has never met.225 Appellate review is spotty, with
students who appeal subjected to enhanced punishments.226
Because the bulk of student conduct cases are conducted in secret and produce sealed records, one hesitates to draw sweeping conclusions about the nature of the proceedings, which vary in quality from time to time and from place
to place. On occasion, however, litigation filed in real courts allows parties to
obtain university records through discovery, and judicial opinions describe their
contents. The news is not encouraging.
In 2017, a federal judge in Massachusetts denied a motion to dismiss submitted by Amherst College in response to a lawsuit filed by a student expelled
from the college.227 Finding that the student had “alleged facts from which a
jury could reasonably infer the College acted in a manner that prevented him
from receiving the ‘thorough, impartial and fair’ investigation promised in
the Student Handbook and thereby also denied him a fair adjudication of the
complaint against him,” the judge allowed the case to proceed to discovery.228
223

See infra notes 229, 234, and accompanying text.
See infra Section III.F.
225
See, e.g., Doe v. Regents of the U.C., No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL at 3 (Cal.
Super. Ct., July 10, 2015).
226
See Haug v. State Univ. N.Y Potsdam, 149 A.D.3d 1200, 1203 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 6,
2017) (“Upon petitioner’s appeal from the decision of the Hearing Board, the Appellate
Board, sua sponte and without any explanation, recommended enhancing the penalty to expulsion.”); Regents of the U.C., No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL at 5 (finding that “the
university abused its discretion in increasing sanctions after appeal without explanation”).
227
See Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195 (D. Mass. 2017).
228
Id. at 220.
224
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Among the evidence mentioned by the judge was: the college gave Doe less
than a week to respond to the initial accusation;229 led Doe to believe that confidentiality rules prohibited him from conducting his own investigation;230 allowed its own lawyer to attend the disciplinary hearing while Doe’s lawyer
could not;231 and prevented Doe from offering newly-discovered evidence, the
existence of which became known during the hearing and soon afterward.232
The new information included evidence that a campus student activist running
a “very public campaign to see a male student expelled for sexual assault” had
edited the accuser’s complaint against Doe, as well as text messages indicating
that the accuser had initiated the sexual activity found by the college to be nonconsensual.233
The seven-day period granted to Doe to respond to the accusations may
seem unusual, but similar windows actually are quite common in Title IX cases.234 These very tight deadlines likely result from pressure on universities by
the DOE OCR to resolve cases quickly, normally within sixty days. Although
the OCR stated that it “does not require a school to complete investigations
within 60 days” and instead judges promptness on a case-by-case basis, institutions have also been told that sixty days is sufficient “in typical cases” and that
the “60-calendar day timeframe refers to the entire investigation process.”235
The OCR has explained further that while “this timeframe does not include appeals, a school should be aware that an unduly long appeals process may impact whether the school’s response was prompt and equitable as required by Title IX.”236 The incentive for universities to move the Title IX business along is
quite strong.

229

See id. at 210.
See id. at 212.
231
See id. at 207.
232
See id. at 212–13.
233
See id. at 213.
234
See e.g., Prasad v. Cornell Univ., No. 5:15-CV-322, 2016 WL 3212079, at *7 (N.D.N.Y.
Feb. 24, 2016) (noting Cornell’s refusal to grant accused student five-day extension of time
“to respond to the Investigative Report consisting of information gathered over several
months’ of investigation,” despite deadline falling during final examination period).
235
See U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 31–32 (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/do
cs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/J552-AMZ3] (noting that the process includes
“conducting the fact-finding investigation, holding a hearing . . . to determine whether the
alleged sexual violence occurred and created a hostile environment, and determining what
actions the school will take to eliminate the hostile environment . . . including imposing
sanctions against the perpetrator and providing remedies for the complainant and school
community, as appropriate”); see also U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFFICE CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 12
(noting September 2017 withdrawal of the 2014 Q&A guidance).
236
U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFFICE CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 235.
230
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In 2015, a University of California, Davis student sought judicial relief after being suspended without a hearing.237 The university had not only barred the
student from campus but also ordered him to stay out of Davis, California entirely.238 Stating that “due process has completely been obliterated” by the university’s conduct, the judge noted that “ ‘if anyone has failed the alleged victim
in this case [it] is the University.’ ”239 The court ordered the plaintiff reinstated
as a student.240
In Prasad v. Cornell University, a 2016 decision in which the court denied
a motion to dismiss claims filed against Cornell by a suspended student,241 the
judge recited a variety of odd procedures that contributed to a perception of unfairness and justified allowing Prasad’s gender-discrimination claim to reach
discovery.242 Among other things, the university (1) granted the complainant
extensions of time but denied them to the accused; (2) prevented the accused
from asking any questions of the complainant, even by submitting them to a
hearing examiner for consideration; (3) relied upon a flawed “Investigative Report” that misrepresented the statements of witnesses; and (4) determined the
complainant’s blood-alcohol level on the night of the sexual activity at issue
“based solely on [her] self-reported weight and alcohol consumption” and the
assistance of an online BAC calculator, despite witness testimony suggesting
that she could not possibly have been as drunk as the resulting numbers implied.243
In another 2016 decision, a federal court in Virginia recounted the slipshod
process by which another “John Doe” was suspended from James Madison
University.244 Doe was accused of sexual misconduct.245 Despite procedural
hurdles, such as a prohibition on Doe receiving documents related to the case
(he was allowed to read them and take notes, but could not take them with
him), Doe convinced a university hearing board that he was “not responsible”
(that is, not guilty).246 The alleged victim appealed the finding,247 and then the
shoddy procedures began in earnest. The university allowed Doe’s accuser to
state (in a document filed with the appellate board) that Doe had sexually as237

See Press Release, Werksman Jackson Hathaway & Quinn, California Judge Issues
Stinging Rebuke of UC Davis’ Handling of Title IX Sexual Misconduct Case (Oct. 12,
2015).
238
See id. (describing Sept. 22, 2015 hearing).
239
See id.
240
See id.
241
Prasad v. Cornell Univ., No. 5:15-CV-322, 2016 WL 3212079, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 24,
2016).
242
See id. at *14–*17.
243
See id. at *8–*9, *15–*16, & *9 n.18 (noting that university officials decided that the
complainant had a BAC of .33 or .43).
244
See Doe v. Alger, 175 F. Supp. 3d 646, 648 (W.D. Va. 2016).
245
See id.
246
See id. at 651–52.
247
See id. at 648.
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saulted a different, unnamed student, and Doe had no opportunity to investigate
the charge.248 Also, after the accuser claimed that her roommate had lied to the
original hearing panel, the university prevented Doe from contacting the
roommate, and the appellate hearing panel never sought evidence from the
roommate.249 The university never informed Doe of the identity of the appellate
board members, gave him no prior notice of the board’s meeting, and did not
permit him to attend the meeting.250 The appellate board suspended Doe for
five-and-one-half years, providing no explanation for its decision.251 Doe sued.
Following discovery, during which Doe produced proof that the university had
concealed further evidence from him that had been provided to the hearing
board, the court granted summary judgment in Doe’s favor on the issue of liability, holding that “the undisputed facts show that Doe did not receive due
process” and allowing him to re-enroll.252
In 2015, a court ordered the University of California, San Diego to set
aside its findings that a student had violated the university’s sexual misconduct
rules, and the court required the university to set aside the sanction—
suspension for one year and a quarter—that it had imposed.253 The court’s opinion listed several reasons that the university hearing was unfair to the accused
student. Among other procedural defects, the hearing officer declined to ask the
accused students’ suggested cross-examination questions of his accuser, including questions the court later found material.254 The accuser testified from behind a screen that prevented the accused from seeing her.255 Also, the university
prosecutor referred in his closing argument to evidence not in the hearing rec-

248

See id. at 652, 662.
See id. at 651, 653, 662. At the original hearing, the roommate had “testified that she did
not believe that Roe was drunk or otherwise incapacitated when she saw her shortly after her
sexual encounter with Doe,” which contradicted the complainant’s version of the events. See
id. (“she claimed that she was drunk during that encounter.”).
250
See id. at 662.
251
See id. at 653.
252
See Doe v. Alger, 228 F. Supp. 3d 713, 716, 729 (W.D. Va. 2016); Doe v. Alger, No.
5:15-CV-00035, 2017 WL 1483577, at *2 (W.D. Va. Apr. 25, 2017) (discussing scope of
equitable relief awarded).
253
Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., S.D., No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL, 2015
WL 4394597, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015).
254
The questions were proposed by the accused to the hearing officer, who chose which
questions to ask. See id. at *2. (“The limiting of the questions in this case curtailed the right
of confrontation crucial to any definition of a fair hearing.”).
255
See id. at *3. For background on the permissibility of screening vulnerable witnesses in
criminal cases, see generally Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1022 (1988) (restricting such use);
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990) (allowing it in some circumstances). I mention
these cases not to suggest that university hearings must mimic criminal courtrooms but instead to flag the screening practice—which I am told is quite common on at least some campuses—as one that will seem jarring to veterans of other venues of adjudication.
249
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ord, which the factfinder then relied upon.256 Further, the university did not
provide the accused student with records of witness interviews, including interviews of the accuser, conducted by university investigators, and it denied the
accused the names of several witnesses.257 The trial court noted that the accused
was entitled a fair hearing, “a real one, not a sham or a pretense,”258 and it held
that the UCSD “hearing was unfair.”259 Later, the California Court of Appeal
would overrule the trial court, holding that the UCSD procedures were not so
terrible as to violate the constitutional rights of the accused student.260 After
stating, “we are concerned that the procedure employed by UCSD has great potential to be unfair to a student accused of violating the Sex Offense Policy,”
the court concluded, “[t]hat said, on the record before us, we cannot say that the
procedure used by UCSD violates due process.”261
The upshot of decisions like the one in the UCSD case is that, under current law, a great deal of questionable procedures may fall within the range of
permissible options available to universities.262 If universities wish to admit
hearsay—including double hearsay, in which the report of an absent investigator contains hearsay uttered by additional absent witnesses—they may.263 If
universities wish to muzzle the lawyers hired by students, they may.264 If universities wish to deny discovery to students, they may.265 A university may
even deny the accused copies of notes recounting interviews of the accuser, at
least sometimes.266
Legal, however, is not the same as sound. Justice Antonin Scalia is known
for wishing judges would stamp “Stupid but constitutional!” on certain complaints.267 Observers of the campus discipline world should similarly observe
256

See Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., S.D., 2015 WL 4394597, at *3 (holding that the
factfinder “improperly delegates the panel’s duty to an outside witness that was not present
at the hearing”).
257
See id.
258
See id. (quoting Ciechon v. City of Chi., 686 F.2d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1982)).
259
See id. at *6.
260
See Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., S.D., 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 479, 523 (Cal. Ct. App.
2016).
261
Id. at 519.
262
See Doe v. Skidmore Coll., 152 A.D.3d 932, 935 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (listing various
informal processes that universities may employ and then finding that university failed to
follow its own rules).
263
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., S.D., 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 497.
264
See infra Section III.F (discussing limitations on roles of lawyers at hearings).
265
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., S.D., 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 513. (“There is no formal right
to discovery in student conduct review hearings.”).
266
See id. (noting that “the failure to turn over Dalcourt’s interview notes from her two
meetings with Jane gives us pause. . . . [and] we can see, in certain circumstances, the need
for such a requirement. In a case like the one before us, there are only two witnesses to the
incident” but declining to find a violation in this case).
267
See Obituary: Antonin Scalia, Always Right, ECONOMIST (Feb. 20, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/obituary/21693161-originalist-chief-devout-andcolourful-end-was-79-obituary-antonin-scalia [https://perma.cc/X9KB-999A].
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that many universities’ policies concurrently (1) are not so offensive to judges’
sense of fair play that they violate constitutional due process guarantees, yet (2)
are lousy, risk unfairness, and ought to be changed. And on top of that, some
are so bad that they violate the law—and must be changed whether universities
want to or not.
It may not be obvious how questionable procedures would exacerbate racial bias. Whatever one’s position on the use of hearsay in college hearings, the
same evidence is generally admissible against students of all races. It could be
that improving university procedures will affect all students in approximately
the same way. I would suggest, however, that one purpose of well-crafted procedures is to help factfinders reach fair and accurate results. If implicit bias infects the perceptions of victims, other witnesses, investigators, and factfinders,
then the consequences of unfair and inaccurate decisions seem likely to hurt
minority students in particular. The greater availability of lawyers to white students—who tend to have more money than minority students—increases the
risk that unsound procedures will fuel disparate impact.
F. Lawyers for Students Have Limited Roles, and Lawyers Are Expensive
When Shakespeare’s character Dick the Butcher suggests, “The first thing
we do, let’s kill all the lawyers,”268 the playwright did not expect the audience
to deem Dick a proponent of sound social policy.269 The old saying goes that
there can be no liberty without law,270 and no law without lawyers,271 making
the elimination of lawyers a goal of aspiring tyrants.272 The history of criminal
trials provides further evidence of the importance of legal counsel, and Parliament acted back in the days of King William of Orange to rectify the injustices
performed by the courts of King James II, whose “Hanging Judge,” George Jef268

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH 61; see also Debbie Vogel, ‘Kill the Lawyers,’ a Line Misinterpreted, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1990) (“Shakespeare meant it as a compliment to attorneys and judges who instill justice in society.”).
269
Dick is speaking to the rebel Jack Cade, who has been imagining his future reign as king
of England. Cade replies, “[T]hat I mean to do” and laments how a “parchment [i.e., a legal
document], being scribbled o’er, should undo a man” SHAKESPEARE, supra note 268.
270
See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 232 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 1960)
(chapter on “The Origins of the Rule of Law”); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 149 (Lee Ward ed., 1988) (“[W]here there is no law, there is no freedom”).
271
Bar associations often reiterate this portion of the maxim, repeating it across the centuries
worldwide. See, e.g., Joe Dinga Pefok, Cameroon Bar Protests Exclusion from State Issues,
CAMEROON POSTLINE (May 23, 2016) http://www.cameroonpostline.com/cameroon-barprotests-exclusion-from-state-issues [https://perma.cc/W3Y2-AKA8] (quoting bar association leader on lawyers: “They are the ones to ensure that justice reigns for all. In fact, if there
are no lawyers, there will be no law.”); Robert A. Hunter, 22 LA. BAR ASS’N. REP. 12 (1921).
272
Speakers at conventions of law professors add, “And there will be no lawyers without
law schools.” See Barbara Elenbaas, Microsoft President Brad Smith Looks to the Future of
Legal Education in AALS Plenary Address, ASS’N AM. L. SCH. (2017),
https://www.aals.org/about/publications/newsletters/aals-news-winter-2017/aals-2017-plen
ary-address [https://perma.cc/3T87-HPWZ].
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fries, oversaw the Bloody Assizes.273 The Treason Trials Act of 1696 provided
that treason defendants could be represented by counsel, a right later extended
to ordinary felony defendants.274 One need not analogize Title IX hearings to
treason prosecutions—if for no reason other than that expulsion, sometimes
called the “academic death penalty,”275 is only a metaphorical form of capital
punishment—to understand that legal counsel might be useful to students accused of misconduct.276
A recent case at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis
(“IUPUI”) provides facts similar to those at many universities. Jeremiah Marshall, an IUPUI sophomore, was accused of sexual assault and appeared at a
university hearing.277 This is how a federal judge described who did what at the
hearing:
Ms. Hinton, a non-practicing attorney and cum laude graduate of the University
of Notre Dame Law School, presented IUPUI’s case against Marshall, presenting evidence and questioning and cross-examining witnesses. In contrast, Marshall was forced to represent himself at the hearing. IUPUI only allowed one of
Marshall’s three attorneys to be present with him at the hearing, and the sole attorney was not permitted to speak on Marshall’s behalf.278

IUPUI’s treatment of lawyers representing accused students is not unusual
among universities, and the court reviewing Marshall’s due process challenge
to the procedure reported accurately that under current law, universities generally have no duty to allow students’ lawyers to speak at hearings.279
Some institutions restrict even further the activities of students’ lawyers. At
Amherst College, accused students may hire private lawyers, but these lawyers
are “required to remain outside of any hearing room,” even though the university’s lawyers “may be present to provide legal counsel to the Chair and to the
Hearing Board members.”280 Similarly, Stephens College allows students to
bring a “support person” to hearings, but those persons “may not be external to
the college community (i.e. parents or attorneys).”281
273

See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (2005).
Id.
275
See, e.g., Rebecca Moore Howard, Plagiarisms, Authorships, and the Academic Death
Penalty, 57 C. ENG. 788, 789 (1995).
276
Counsel would also be useful to complainants seeking to vindicate their claims of victimization. As discussed below, see infra Part V, the current system may also be biased against
minority victims of campus crime (in addition to accused minority students), and limited access to counsel could exacerbate this problem.
277
See Marshall v. Ind. Univ., 170 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1203–04 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
278
Id. at 1204–05. Maria Hinton was Assistant Director of Student Conduct at IUPUI. See
id. at 1204.
279
See id. at 1207–08.
280
Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 207 (D. Mass. 2017).
281
See STEPHENS COLLEGE, STUDENT HANDBOOK 53 (discussing “support persons” in other
college proceedings); id. at 119 (“The accused student is entitled to be assisted by and accompanied to the hearing by one member of the Stephens College faculty or staff as a support person.”).
274
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Credible policy arguments have been advanced to support excluding lawyers from university conduct hearings or limiting their roles in various ways,
such as preventing them from questioning witnesses or from speaking at all.
For example, advocates caution against “criminaliz[ing]” Title IX and argue
that procedural protections appropriate for criminal trials have no place in university hearings.282 They remind Title IX’s critics that restrictions on lawyers’
behavior are not unique to campus sexual assault allegations, sexual harassment
cases, or other claims of discrimination.283 Instead, campus discipline hearings
more generally tend to have limited roles for lawyers, perhaps because universities wish to avoid importing the elaborate procedures of real courts into the
less formal hearing rooms at which colleges adjudicate allegations of plagiarism, underage drinking, and vandalism.284 Such arguments rebut well the contention that campus sexual assault “respondents” should enjoy special procedural protections unavailable to those accused of serious offenses unrelated to
sex, such as hazing or even homicide.285 For purposes of this Article, I need not
resolve the policy question of how robustly lawyers should be allowed to participate in campus discipline hearings. Rather, I will make the more limited
claim that robust participation by lawyers (whatever the offense at issue) might
often prove helpful to accused students, which is why accused students request
such active participation and why advocates for greater “due process” protections in campus hearings tend to raise the issue of lawyers for the accused.
In considering this more limited claim—that is, that lawyers are indeed
useful to accused students, and those able to obtain them are wise to do so—I
would ask readers, whatever their opinion on my Article and on-campus adjudications more generally, to consider a hypothetical. If your child (or the child
of a close friend) were accused of sexual assault on campus, and the child
asked you whether it would make sense to hire a lawyer to protect the child’s
interests, what would you say? If your answer is, “Yes, get a lawyer,” would
you prefer that the presentation of evidence and the questioning of witnesses
could be delegated to the lawyer, or would you prefer that those tasks be assigned to the youth accused of misconduct? Again, one need not agree that accused students should enjoy such assistance of counsel to understand why it
might be helpful. If minority students are disproportionately accused of campus
offenses, then any limitations on the role of lawyers for the accused will disproportionately burden minority students.286

282

See Cantalupo, supra note 185, at 283.
See id. at 286.
284
See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to
Reform, 125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1985 (2016).
285
See id. at 1997.
286
Similarly, if minority students are disproportionately the victims of campus violence, the
role of lawyers has additional implications. See infra Part V.
283
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Further, other than at the very small number of universities that provide
lawyers to accused students at the institution’s expense,287 students seeking legal assistance must turn to private lawyers whom they may not be able to afford.288 Because income and wealth are not evenly distributed among Americans of all races, minority students are particularly likely to lack the money
needed to hire a lawyer.289 If lawyers are helpful to accused students—even under the constraints imposed by universities upon lawyers—and minority students are less likely to have lawyers, then the university discipline system becomes that much more likely to have a disparate impact.
G. Faculty and Administrators Who Might Normally Speak Up for Racial
Justice Are Afraid to Undermine Title IX Enforcement, or to Appear Soft
on Rape
Given the real possibility that university discipline systems discriminate
against minority students, one might wonder why more faculty members and
administrators do not demand reform. After all, many faculty members and
administrators take racial bias seriously and determinedly seek change on several fronts, such as curricular reform, cultural competence training, campus
climate initiatives, and the recruitment of a more diverse faculty and student
body.290 A few answers suggest themselves: Perhaps the secretive and legalistic
nature of university discipline processes deter public complaints, or perhaps the
heavy-handed intervention of federal officials makes campus resistance seem
futile.291 To me, two other possibilities loom large: First, faculty members and
administrators likely are largely unaware of the potential disparate racial impact
described in this Article, which exists to promote greater attention to the problem. Second, those academics aware of the issue may fear undermining—or
even appearing to undermine—efforts to promote gender equity and combat
campus sexual assault. Lack of awareness perhaps can be cured. But awareness
287

See Ariel Kaminer, New Factor in Campus Sexual Assault Cases: Counsel for the Accused, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/nyregion/newfactor-in-campus-sexual-assault-cases-counsel-for-the-accused.html
[https://perma.cc/TDD6-GDXX].
288
See id. (“But success does not come cheaply. Litigating a case through a trial could cost
$100,000. . . .”).
289
See Michal Grinstein-Weiss et al., Racial Disparities in Education Debt Burden among
Low- and Moderate-Income Households, BROOKINGS INST., (Apr. 29, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/racial-disparities-in-education-debt-burden-among-lowand-moderate-income-households-2 [https://perma.cc/96NH-VZ2L].
290
See, e.g., Andrew M. Duehren & Daphne C. Thompson, In Debate Over Names, History
and Race Relations Collide, HARV. CRIMSON (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.thecrimson.com/art
icle/2016/1/19/faust-name-title-changes- [https://perma.cc/D3QK-8TVL]; Katherine Mangan, After Missouri’s Leadership Exodus, Hard Questions Loom on Race, Power, and Culture, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.chronicle.com/article/AfterMissouri-s-Leadership/234145 [https://perma.cc/KKY9-QC9W]; see also supra text accompanying notes 135–141 (describing efforts at universities to promote racial equality).
291
See supra Section III.D; infra Section V.
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will not suffice if knowledgeable academics avoid difficult conversations about
substantive policy decisions.
The experience of Professor Laura Kipnis, who teaches media studies at
Northwestern University and objected to certain university rules concerning
professor-student dating,292 has certainly encouraged shyness in the academy.
After publishing an article in the Chronicle of Higher Education that discussed
an ongoing Title IX case at Northwestern, in which a student had accused a
professor of sexual harassment and which had been widely reported in the
press,293 Kipnis found herself among the accused.294 She was cleared of wrongdoing after elaborate proceedings, and she wrote a book about her case and the
regulation of campus sex more generally.295 A graduate student mentioned in
the book has sued Kipnis for defamation.296 On the one hand, Kipnis’s story
seems like it could have been scripted by opponents of the Title IX status quo
seeking to make the whole system look silly, humorless, and dangerous. Her
attackers have given Kipnis attention and credibility, and she discusses in her
book how, after she was charged with creating a “hostile environment,”
strangers from all over America contacted her with material for her brief opposing what she describes as a “moral panic” comparable to McCarthyism and the
“Satanic ritual abuse preschool trials of the 1980s.”297 On the other hand, who
needs that kind of hassle?298 It is one thing to support free expression on campus in general, and quite another to wish that students will use their free speech
rights to protest you in particular.
Not all repercussions arising from opposition to the current university discipline enforcement system are as dramatic as lawsuits and charges of campus
misconduct. Critics also face garden-variety accusations of joining the
“[b]acklash to progress in the context of sexual assault”299 and “undermin[ing]
Title IX’s central purpose: to protect and promote equal educational opportuni292

See Laura Kipnis, Sexual Paranoia Strikes Academe, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 27,
2015), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Sexual-Paranoia-Strikes/190351 [https://perma.cc/
73MU-B29U].
293
See id.
294
See Laura Kipnis, My Title IX Inquisition, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 29, 2015),
http://www.chronicle.com/article/My-Title-IX-Inquisition/230489 [https://perma.cc/K4AN54P9].
295
See KIPNIS, supra note 90, at 5–6.
296
See Katherine Mangan, Laura Kipnis Is Sued over Portrayal of Graduate Student in
Book on Campus ‘Sexual Paranoia’, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 18, 2017),
http://www.chronicle.com/article/Laura-Kipnis-Is-Sued-Over/240105 [https://perma.cc/3KJ
C-TKD9].
297
See KIPNIS, supra note 90, at 1.
298
I will admit some personal concern on this score. Yet, if the tenured faculty won’t write
articles that annoy people in the service of prompting difficult conversations, who will?
299
See Anderson, supra note 284, at 1981–82 (“In general, the resistance to progressive reform of campus sexual assault has mirrored the backlash to the progressive reform of rape
law. . . .”); Johnson, supra note 3, at 58 (“In many ways, this response mirrors the wave of
criticism levied at progressive reform of rape law in the criminal justice system.”).
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ty for all students.”300 In response to authors who raise the premise of this Article—that is, that adopting “OCR’s policies . . . will lead to a disparate impact
against men of color, particularly black men”—one commentator raised “the
question of whether the invocation of race comes from a place of genuine concern or a place of convenience.”301 I do not mean to overstate the consequences
of having one’s racial justice bona fides questioned by a law review author; the
distinguished scholars whose “invocation of race” was questioned will do just
fine and are not likely to face dismissal from the Harvard Law School faculty.
But not everyone has tenure or a judicial pension, and legal scholars desiring
tranquility might wish to focus on something other than campus sex regulation.
Outside law school walls, faculty in other disciplines—who do speak up from
time to time about university governance—might also direct their attention to
other topics because of a desire (perhaps conscious, perhaps not) to avoid accusations of supporting rape culture.302
Observers of campus culture will note a great overlap among faculty members and administrators who agitate for reforms promoting gender equity and
those who agitate for reforms promoting racial equality. As a result, many academics who might otherwise be most sympathetic to a race-based critique of
campus policy will be hesitant to choose this particular fight.
H. Investigations of Alleged Sexual Misconduct Are Affected by Collective
American Attitudes toward Race and Sex
In addition to all the factors listed above that contribute to the risk of disparate racial impact in university disciplinary systems, one factor merits increasing attention as universities devote more resources to policing and adjudicating campus sex. American law has stigmatized sexual relations between
black men and white women since before American independence.303 When
black male students are accused of sexual misconduct toward white female students,304 investigators and factfinders will bring to the table centuries of cultural
baggage. Professor Halley has listed cultural touchstones familiar to students of
American racial history: Emmet Till, the Central Park Five, and To Kill a

300

See Cantalupo, supra note 185, at 284.
See Johnson, supra note 3, at 59–60, 59 n.24, 60 n.28. Nancy Gertner is a retired federal
judge and a senior lecturer on law at Harvard. Janet Halley is the Royall Professor of Law at
Harvard.
302
See Margo Kaplan, Rape Beyond Crime, 66 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1065 (2017) (discussing
concept of “rape culture”); Mary Graw Leary, Affirmatively Replacing Rape Culture with
Consent Culture, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 54–55 (2016) (discussing use of Title IX to combat rape culture on campus).
303
See IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF
RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA 41 (2016) (discussing penalties imposed by colonial legislatures
on white women who had sex with black men).
304
For an example of such a case in which the disciplined student eventually sued the university for racial discrimination, see supra notes 107–115 and accompanying text.
301
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Mockingbird.305 I would add Loving v. Virginia.306 Mildred Loving died just a
decade ago, and she was only sixty-eight.307 These days we cheerfully recall
that the Supreme Court of the United States decided Loving unanimously. One
year earlier, however, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had also acted
unanimously. It affirmed the conviction of Mildred and Richard Loving for violating “the Virginia statutes relating to miscegenetic marriages,”308 supporting
the opinion of the trial judge, who stated: “Almighty God created the races
white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents.
And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for
such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.”309 Yes, half a century has transpired since then. But
few will dispute that even fifty-plus years after Loving, interracial couples are
not treated identically to same-race couples in the United States. Universities
understand this truth, which is confirmed by social science research, including
studies of college students.310 This knowledge spurs efforts to train students
(and faculty and staff) in greater cultural competency.
University researchers know that Americans perceive sexual relationships
differently depending on the races of the participants. Historians know how
Americans have treated interracial couples in the past. Law faculty members
teach how attitudes toward race affect the criminal justice system today and explain in part how so many black men have been wrongfully convicted of rape.
Psychologists know that interracial relationships arouse disproportionate disgust in observers, despite surveys in which respondents claim to approve of interracial marriage. It would be bizarre if administrators in charge of university
disciplinary systems expected their results to be untainted by racial bias when
they adjudicate accusations of nonconsensual interracial sex, interracial sexual
harassment, and similar violations of university rules. That said, the limited data now available do not allow anyone to determine what percentage of campus
sexual misconduct cases involve complainants and respondents of different
races. Because the race of victims and defendants have proven so important to
outcomes in the criminal justice system,311 this form of racial bias merits further investigation on campus.
305

See Halley, supra note 3, at 106.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
307
See Douglas Martin, Mildred Loving, Who Battled Ban on Mixed-Race Marriage, Dies at
68, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/06/us/06loving.html
[https://perma.cc/JWR3-4YD8].
308
See Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78, 80 (Va. 1966).
309
Loving, 388 U.S. at 3.
310
See, e.g., Allison L. Skinner & Caitlin M. Hudac, “Yuck, You Disgust Me!” Affective Bias Against Interracial Couples, 68 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 68, 68 (2016) (“Overall,
the current findings provide evidence that interracial couples elicit disgust and are dehumanized relative to same-race couples.”).
311
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 321 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“few of the
details of the crime or of McCleskey’s past criminal conduct were more important [to
306
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

To begin addressing the likely existence of widespread racially disparate
impact in college and university student discipline, I suggest two responses.
First, colleges and universities should begin collecting and publishing data similar to that produced by K–12 institutions for inclusion in the Civil Rights Data
Collection (CRDC) maintained by the U.S. Department of Education.312 The
Office for Civil Rights should mandate such reporting and should then publish
the data. Second, whoever on campus is in charge of combating racial bias and
discrimination in general should acknowledge this issue and use whatever
measures would be considered appropriate to respond to other manifestations
racial injustice.
A. Collect Data, and Make It Public
With a few clicks, anyone with internet access can obtain a CRDC “Discipline Report” for a K–12 school district or an individual school. These reports
reveal the race and ethnicity of students receiving disciplinary actions such as
in-school suspensions, out-of-school suspensions, and expulsions. For example,
at David H. Hickman High School, for which my Columbia, Missouri neighborhood is currently zoned, 117 out-of-school suspensions were recorded during the 2013–2014 survey year.313 The school’s overall population of 1,786
students was 18.5 percent black, and the population of students receiving outof-school suspensions was 63.2 percent black.314 Because these figures are easily accessible (I obtained them in less than a minute), the Columbia Daily Tribune has been able to report on racial bias in the local school district’s discipline
regime with facts, instead of guesswork and opinion.315 And the newspaper has
rich data to review instead of mere anecdotes. These newspaper articles helped
to inspire public interest in the reported racial disparities. Further, the mere exwhether he would be executed] than the fact that his victim was white”); see also Hetey &
Eberhardt, supra note 81 at 1949 (discussing effect of defendant’s appearance on punishment imposed). Note too that if the victim’s race affects enforcement decisions on campus
(as it does in the criminal justice system), then minority students may receive inadequate
protection. See infra Part V.
312
For background on the CRDC, see Office for Civil Rights, Civil Rights Data Collection
(CRDC), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/data.html [https://perma.cc/CY88-AD
2N].
313
See David H. Hickman High, Discipline Report, Office of Civil Rights, Civil Rights Data
Collection (2013), https://ocrdata.ed.gov/Page?t=s&eid=255949&syk=7&pid=2268&sr=1&
Report=6 [https://perma.cc/Q6S2-PP6L].
314
Id.
315
See Catherine Martin, Black Students Still Get Most Suspensions in Columbia Public
Schools, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Sept. 9, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.columbiatribune.com/
1b6ebf38-197b-11e3-a45d-10604b9f6eda.html [https://perma.cc/8ARW-X4LN]; Roger
McKinney, Black and Low-Income Students More Frequently Suspended from School,
COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Dec. 28, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.columbiatribune.com/e126a57
e-da88-5f54-ad51-0e152afd24fc.html [https://perma.cc/NP7A-WGD3].
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istence of the data—even if never reported in the media—allows district administrators and Board of Education members to understand the extent of the problem in their jurisdiction. When I served on the Policy Committee of the Board
of Education,316 I participated in discussions about racial bias that likely would
have been impossible absent the CRDC data. At least in part because of the existence of CRDC reports accessible to the community, the school district implemented measures designed to reduce bias.317 These efforts may work, and
they may not. Fortunately, future CRDC surveys will help administrators,
Board of Education members, and the public to find out. Also, because every
school district in the country collects and reports the same information,318 one
can compare results among jurisdictions and against national trends.
By contrast, during my term as chair of the campus-wide Faculty Council
at the University of Missouri,319 I had no way of evaluating whether Mizzou’s
student discipline system produced racial bias at greater or lesser rates than
peer institutions and national averages. I appointed two committees that examined the equity resolution process at the university and offered suggestions for
reform, many of which were adopted.320 These committees did important work,
and their suggestions have made real improvements to a complicated system. I
realized at some point while the committees were working that I had no idea
whether Mizzou’s student discipline system (of which the equity resolution
process is only a part),321 produced racially disparate outcomes. I can easily
find data on discipline at Missouri’s elementary and secondary schools, as well
as in its criminal justice system, that allow me to examine racial disparities. But
if I wish to compare the student disciplinary systems at Mizzou to those at Missouri State, Washington University, and other universities, hardly any data are
publicly available.

316

I served as a community member of the committee from 2013 to 2016. I was not a member of the Board of Education.
317
See Martin, supra note 315 (“This year, the district is also looking to start restorative justice. The practice focuses on alternative disciplinary actions that don’t remove the students
from the traditional school setting.”); McKinney, supra note 315 (discussing equity training
of district personnel and teaching “with poverty in mind”).
318
The CRDC is a mandatory program for schools receiving federal funds, authorized under
the statutes and regulations implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as well as
under other law, such as Title IX). See 34 C.F.R. § 100.6(b) (2016); 34 C.F.R. § 106.71
(2016).
319
I was chair from 2015 to 2017.
320
See Ad Hoc Committee on Civil Rights and Title IX, Report from the MU Faculty Council on University Policy (Apr. 4, 2017) (on file with author) (reviewing recommendations of
previous ad hoc committee, acknowledging acceptance of some proposals by university administration, and advocating additional changes).
321
Offenses unrelated to discrimination are handled separately. Different university officials
adjudicate charges of academic dishonesty, as well as misbehavior such as underage drinking.
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The U.S. Department of Education should use its authority under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act322 to require that colleges and universities immediately
begin collecting the sort of data already reported by elementary and secondary
schools to the CRDC. If public schools across the country can manage this task,
higher education institutions—which already prepare all sorts of reports to satisfy requirements associated with federal funding—should be able to manage.
At a minimum, colleges and universities should collect demographic data (including race/ethnicity, sex, disability status,323 and income324) for all students
receiving suspension and expulsion. It would be helpful if the data could be
disaggregated by offense (perhaps with broad categories such as academic dishonesty, equity/discrimination violations, and drug/alcohol abuse), thereby allowing one to examine whether racial bias is more prevalent in discipline for
some offenses than for others. Even better would be data that track demographics of both complainants and respondents, including for cases in which
no discipline is imposed.
Although I believe that the U.S. Department of Education should require
the submission of this information by colleges and universities receiving federal funds,325 which would necessitate the establishment of uniform metrics, I
hope that colleges and university leaders can get ahead of federal demands and
begin crafting their own lists of desired data.326 Administrators might call upon
322

Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in education programs or activities which receive federal assistance. The DOE OCR enforces Title
VI against educational institutions, including universities. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
EDUCATION AND TITLE VI, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/hq43e4.html
[https://perma.cc/SBW5-FRXW].
323
At the K–12 level, disability status is measured by whether someone is an “IDEA student,” which refers to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. At the post-secondary
level, one might consider whether a student has received disability-related accommodations
for coursework or examinations.
324
At the K-12 level, income status is tracked by recording which students are eligible for
free or reduced-price school lunches. See McKinney, supra note 315. At the post-secondary
level, one might use eligibility for Pell Grants.
325
In an earlier draft of this Article, I suggested that “while the Department is considering
this issue, it might wish to scrap or amend the ‘60-calendar day timeframe’ mentioned in
previous DOE guidance, see supra note 235 and accompanying text, that has inspired so
much haste on the part of university officials. A bit more time could lead to greater fairness
and accuracy.” The DOE OCR subsequently released a guidance document that appears to
have effected this change. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS , Q&A ON
CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 3 (2017) (asking “What time frame constitutes a ‘prompt’
investigation?” and answering “There is no fixed time frame under which a school must
complete a Title IX investigation.”). Additional guidance, yet to be released, may make more
clear how “OCR will evaluate a school’s good faith effort to conduct a fair, impartial investigation in a timely manner.” Id.
326
In addition, while DOE leaders are considering whether to require data collection by all
colleges and universities receiving federal funds, in the meantime OCR staff could begin including data collection mandates in voluntary resolution agreements that the department
reaches with institutions accused of Title IX or Title VI violations. For discussion of such an
agreement, see supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text.
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their diversity and equity officers, who could, in turn, enlist assistance from the
National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education and from
ATIXA, the Association of Title IX Administrators. Presidents and chancellors
might also consult their general counsels, who could contact the National Association of College and University Attorneys for guidance. Student affairs professionals, who run most campus discipline systems, could advise about offense
categories. Regardless of whether campus leaders offer suggestions, the Department of Education should promulgate reporting requirements and should
make the resulting data available online, either in the CRDC or in a similar database.327 Uniform reporting standards will allow apples-to-apples comparisons
across institutions.
B. Anti-Bias Trainers, Train Thyselves
Meanwhile, as we wait for data reports to populate the post-secondary student discipline database, colleges and universities can begin attacking the problem. Scholars and administrators across America have devoted themselves to
promoting fairness and equity in higher education, publishing research on matters such as reducing campus sexual violence,328 encouraging intervention
against anti-LGBT discrimination,329 promoting success by black men in STEM
fields,330 and encouraging persistence among students with disabilities enrolled
in online graduate programs.331 I will not presume to instruct these experts on
their work but will instead entreat them to consider whether I have raised a real
problem related to their bailiwick, and, if so, how they might use their
knowledge and campus influence to respond.
Lest I be accused of not offering any potential solutions, however, I will
offer a few ideas that can perhaps be added to whatever proposals may be
forthcoming from elsewhere. To begin, colleges and universities might review
the factors discussed above in Part IV, some of which may be, at least in part,
susceptible to intervention by campus leaders. For example, to reduce the effect
of implicit bias on those who make decisions related to student discipline, colleges and universities may wish to develop training modules similar to those
already offered to hiring committee members and others in the campus com327

Further discussion of what sort of information should be collected appears in U.S. DEP’T
EDUC., Guiding Principles: A Resource Guide for Improving School Climate and Discipline 17 (2014) (discussing best data-collection practices at the elementary and secondary
school level).
328
See, e.g., Chris Linder et al., From Margins to Mainstream: Social Media as a Tool for
Campus Sexual Violence Activism, 9 J. DIVERSITY HIGHER EDUC. 231, 231 (2016).
329
See, e.g., Adrienne B. Dessel et al., LGBT Discrimination on Campus and Heterosexual
Bystanders: Understanding Intentions to Intervene, 10 J. DIVERSITY HIGHER EDUC. 101, 101
(2017).
330
See, e.g., Marybeth Gasman et al., Black Male Success in STEM: A Case Study of Morehouse College, 10 J. DIVERSITY HIGHER EDUC. 181, 181 (2017).
331
See, e.g., Susana Verdinelli & Debbi Kutner, Persistence Factors Among Online Graduate Students with Disabilities, 9 J. DIVERSITY HIGHER EDUC. 353, 353 (2016).
OF
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munity.332 Those involved in equity resolution processes—who often lead training sessions for others—should be especially open to education concerning
their own biases because of their appreciation for the importance of such selfexamination.333 Colleges and universities might also benefit from reviewing
their student conduct rules for provisions that are unduly broad and vague, especially rules related to sexual activity and harassment.334 It is not for me to decide how an institution should define “consent,” “stalking,” and other terms in
its rulebook. Whatever the definitions, however, they should be clearly articulated in documents available to students and campus officials who adjudicate
cases.335 Institutions allowing accused students (and complainants, for that matter) to enlist the assistance of counsel should consider providing free legal services to students who cannot otherwise afford lawyers.336 These advisors will
be helpful even at campuses prohibiting lawyers from speaking at hearings.
Finally, simply by acknowledging the likely existence of racial biases in
the student discipline system, campus diversity officers and Title IX administrators can reduce the stigma that might otherwise attach to criticisms leveled
against university offices dedicated to combating sexual violence.337 If concerns
about racial injustice are derided as subterfuge offered to justify the speaker’s
probable disdain for robust responses to campus rape, constructive discussions
are unlikely to ensue. If instead we are willing to walk and chew gum concurrently, we can take sexual violence seriously while also accepting our duty to
reduce racial injustice.
Further advice is available in guidance the U.S. Department of Education
has issued to elementary and secondary schools.338 In “Guiding Principles: A
Resource Guide for Improving School Climate and Discipline,” the Department
offers several ways in which schools can “prevent, identify, reduce, and eliminate discriminatory discipline and unintended consequences.”339 One suggestion is that schools use “proactive, data-driven, and continuous efforts, including gathering feedback from families, students, teachers, and school
personnel.”340 Because of the immense burdens already placed upon campus
332

See supra Section III.B.
Some useful material may be available from the American Bar Association, which prepares anti-bias curricula for judges and lawyers. See generally Implicit Bias Initiative, AM.
BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/task-force-implicitbias.html [https://perma.cc/VJ8K-S8G2] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).
334
See supra Section III.C.
335
Relatedly, university documents analogous to case reporters—that describe campus discipline cases in some detail but without information that would allow identification of individual students—could help observers see how these rules apply in practice.
336
See supra Section III.F.
337
See supra Section III.G.
338
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
339
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 327, at 16. These suggestions overlap in part, but not
entirely, with ideas mentioned above.
340
Id. at 17–18.
333
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offices charged with enforcing civil rights law, it is not reasonable to expect
equity officers to gather all this data and feedback without assistance. Offices
already responsible for institutional research should help to gather and maintain
the needed data, and university leaders can help establish campus equivalents
of the “school discipline team” recommended for K-12 schools.341 Faculty and
student government groups could nominate representatives for a team that
may choose to examine how discipline referrals and sanctions imposed at the
school compare to those at other schools, or randomly review a percentage of
the disciplinary actions taken at each school on an ongoing basis to ensure that
actions taken were non-discriminatory and consistent with the school’s discipline practices.342

These are simply suggestions, and they were not written with colleges and
universities in mind. Nonetheless, the experience of K-12 administrators seeking to reduce disproportionate disciplinary practices in their schools likely has
much to offer campus leaders with the same goals.
V. BROADER IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE RESEARCH
The main point of this Article—that colleges and universities, as well as
the U.S. Department of Education, should act to reduce the disproportionate
campus discipline of minority students—suggests a variety of possible further
research. Topics worthy of additional scholarly attention include (1) possible
effects of campus discipline on already divergent retention rates of students of
different races; (2) how the regulation of campus conduct nationwide by federal
officials is a form of “shadow law,” in which agency staff regulate outside the
formal regulatory process; (3) how federal influence on campus conduct rules
and adjudication procedures exemplifies the declining influence of faculty on
university governance; (4) whether complainants and other student victims of
misconduct receive disparate treatment on the basis of race and, if so, what institutions can do to remedy the problem; and (5) how potentially competing
claims for justice by different disadvantaged groups can be better examined
through the lens of intersectionality. I will address each of these topics quite
briefly here. With luck, other scholars can eventually give them the more robust
attention they deserve.
Retention rates. Black students already graduate from college at lower
rates than white students,343 and university leaders should look carefully at
campus policies that could exacerbate this problem. Not only expulsions but
also less severe punishments can prevent graduation. For example, a student
suspended for a year or two may never return. Students with fewer financial re341

See id. at 17.
Id. at 17–18.
343
D. SHAPIRO ET AL., SIGNATURE 12 SUPPLEMENT: COMPLETING COLLEGE: A NATIONAL
VIEW OF STUDENT ATTAINMENT RATES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY–FALL 2010 COHORT 21
(2017) (“Among students who started in four-year public institutions, black students had the
lowest six-year completion rate (45.9 percent).”).
342
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sources are particularly at risk of having a suspension become a permanent departure from school, especially if they forfeit tuition already paid for the semester during which a suspension becomes effective. If scholarships are revoked
upon findings of misconduct, that would compound the effect on students with
limited means.
Shadow Law. Administrative law scholars sometimes use the term “shadow
law” to refer to agency use of informal methods to administer federal law.344
Shadow law tools, such as policy statements and interpretive rules, allow agencies to regulate without engaging in the formal “notice and comment” process
generally required for federal regulations.345 In recent years the U.S. Department of Education has used a great deal of shadow law—including “Dear Colleague” letters and other guidance documents—to regulate how colleges and
universities adjudicate student conduct cases. While the guidance concerning
burden of proof may have attracted the most attention,346 DOE has gone well
beyond mandating (or even strongly encouraging) the adoption of certain procedures. In enforcing Title IX against universities, DOE OCR officials have required that universities change the definitions of student conduct offenses.347
Whatever the merits of various university policies created and amended pursuant to DOE diktat, scholars may wish to consider whether federal shadow law
should regulate sexual practices—among other behavior—of millions of people.
Declining faculty influence. The rapid amendment of student conduct rules
and procedures in response to federal agency demands illustrates the waning
power of faculty more generally. Scholars of higher education have observed
that the prestige and power of university faculty members have declined significantly since the heady decades following World War II.348 On campuses at
which faculty have tried to slow or stop the adoption of rules written in response to DOE guidance, administrators have enacted them anyway. At Harvard Law School, for example, the due process concerns raised by law faculty
did not stop the university from agreeing to adopt new rules demanded by

344

See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public
Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L.
REV. 277, 279 (1998).
345
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (“After notice required by this section, the agency shall give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of
written data, views, or arguments. . . .”).
346
See Tamara Rice Lave, Ready, Fire, Aim: How Universities Are Failing the Constitution
in Sexual Assault Cases, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637, 642 (2016); Amy Chmielewski, Note, Defending the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in College Adjudications of Sexual Assault, 2013 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 143, 143–44 (2013).
347
See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text (documenting how DOE caused the University of New Mexico to change its definition of sexual harassment, relying upon its own
Dear Colleague letter as authority).
348
See generally MARTIN J. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., THE FACULTY FACTOR: REASSESSING THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY IN A TURBULENT ERA 15–16, 299–306 (2016).
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DOE.349 The DOE press release noted the “strong leadership” of the law dean
and university president who adopted policies—such as the “preponderance of
the evidence” standard and new rules concerning appeals—over vehement faculty objection.350 Whatever system one might prefer for campus discipline cases, there was once a day in which faculty members would design it. Those days
have departed.
Possible disparate treatment of victims by race. As mentioned in the Introduction, this Article focuses on the likely disparate treatment of college and
university students accused of misconduct and does not devote much attention
to possible disparate treatment of complainants and other victims. The treatment of victims, however, merits serious attention. First, victims who do not
receive appropriate responses from colleges and universities are at risk of leaving school or otherwise enjoying lesser access to educational opportunities. Second, if victims of different races are treated differently, institutions send a terrible message about their commitment to racial equality. Because students of
different races may have different attitudes toward campus police and other institutional officials, college and university leaders should consider how best to
encourage reporting by assault victims from disadvantaged populations. They
should also consider how to provide resources that serve students of all backgrounds.
Intersectionality. Finally, the issues presented in this Article raise potentially competing claims for justice by disadvantaged groups—that is, minority
men concerned about racial bias in campus discipline processes, and women
seeking protection from sexual violence. This is an oversimplification of the
issue, but the tension is real. Most Title IX respondents are men, and racial bias
in the adjudication of student conduct will injure black men most of all. Concurrently, most campus sexual assault complainants are women, and any criticism of Title IX enforcement can be seen as an impediment to long-overdue
efforts to protect women from campus predation. Similar tension has been observed during efforts to reform the adjudication of rape in criminal courts, with
some critics arguing that new evidentiary rules designed to help prosecutors
win cases risked the wrongful conviction of minority men.351 Another observer,
the member of Congress who led the effort to enact the new rules, called them
“a triumph for the public—for the women who will not be raped and the chil-
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dren who will not be molested.”352 The rules continue to inspire scholarly debate decades later.353
As discussions ensue among campus administrators, faculty, students, and
others with an interest in how universities regulate student conduct—
particularly sexual misconduct—it may prove wise to consider intersectional
analyses.354 As Professor Crenshaw has discussed, women of color are not
simply women who happen to be members of minority groups, nor are they
members of minority groups who happen to be women. Instead, their “intersectional identities . . . as women of color” yield oppression not fully addressed by
anti-racism and anti-sexism efforts alone.355
When campus leaders move to ameliorate racial injustice in college and
university discipline systems, they should seek feedback from diverse constituencies, thereby increasing the odds that pursuing justice for one group does not
cause harm to another. Robust action against campus sexual assault need not
require racial injustice, and colleges and universities should prove able to respond to the problem identified in this Article without hindering appropriate
enforcement of well-written campus rules.
CONCLUSION
College and university disciplinary procedures almost certainly excessively
punish black students, along with members of other disadvantaged minority
groups. Campus leaders should act now to collect demographic data that would
allow analysis of how their discipline systems affect students of different races.
Further, using its authority under the Civil Rights Act, the U.S. Department of
Education should mandate the collection of this data and should establish nationwide standards for data reporting so that students, faculty, administrators,
and the public can compare one institution with another. Concurrently, colleges
and universities should act to reduce the effect of implicit bias on the student
discipline process, along with other factors that contribute to disparate impact.
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